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NOTES
Bright Lines, Dark Deeds: Counting Convictions Under the
Armed Career Criminal Act
Some criminals will not mend their ways. 1 Authorities find that
these "career criminals"2 commit most of the serious crime in the
United States. 3 In recent years, the criminal justice system has responded specifically to the problems posed by incorrigible felons. Law
enforcement agencies have developed and implemented special pro1. For an illustration, see Leo, A Criminal Lack of Common Sense, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, Aug. 21, 1989, at 56 (recounting the 32-year criminal career of an incorrigible, violent
sex offender and the repeated failures of the California criminal justice system to stop him).
2. Lawmakers and judges use a variety of labels, largely synonymous, to describe this group
of offenders: career criminals, career offenders, habitual offenders, repeat offenders, recidivists.
See, e.g., United States v. Belton, 890 F.2d 9, 10 (7th Cir. 1989) (interchangeable use of terms
"career offender'' and "career criminal"); see also Armed Career Criminal Act: Hearings on H.R.
1627 and S.52 Before the Subcomm. on Crime ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 10, 17-18, 31, 64 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings] (interchangeable use of various labels
during hearings on career criminal legislation).
Generally, career criminals are people who repeatedly commit serious crimes and fail to respond to treatment. See, e.g., Belton, 890 F.2d at 10 (Judge Posner's definition: "A career criminal is incorrigible, undeterrable, recidivating, unresponsive to the 'specific deterrence' of having
been previously convicted •.••"). Some criminologists have ventured a typology within the
broader class of career criminals. Skilled professional criminals who make their living at crime
are labeled "intensives," or "heavies." Others are "intermittents," or "losers," who tend to be
opportunistic and often "oblivious to the risks and consequences of their criminal acts." See J.
PETBRSIUA, P. GREENWOOD & M. LAVIN, CRIMINAL CAREERS OF HABITUAL FELONS x-xi,
152-55 (1978) [hereinafter J. PBTBRSIUA]. The patterns of individual criminals' careers, however, tend to be random and unpredictable, often defying any neat typology. See S. MILLER, S.
DINITZ & ]. CoNRAD, CAREERS OF TIIB VIOLENT 215-16 (1982).
3. The landmark study is M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A
BIRTH CoHORT (1972) [hereinafter M. WOLFGANG]. Having studied the criminal records of
10,000 young males born in Philadelphia in 1945, the authors found that those "chronic offenders" who committed five or more offenses (627 or 18% of all delinquents) had committed a total
of 5,305 offenses - 51.9% of all crimes committed by the cohort's delinquents. Id. at 88; see also
R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 215 (1970) (80% of all felonies committed by repeaters); M.
PETERSON, H. BRAlKBR & s. POLICH, WHO CoMMITS CRIMBs 186-88 (1981) (reporting that
25% of the sampled offenders committed 58% of offenders' armed robberies, 46% of their assaults, and 65% of their burglaries); K. WILLIAMS, THE SCOPE AND PREDICTION OF REcmIVISM 5-6 (1979) (30% of defendants in study accounted for 56% of total arrests). Conviction
data, however, do not sufficiently describe the extent of the harm career criminals cause. Many
commit scores of crimes in addition to those for which they are caught and punished. See J.
PBTBRSILIA, supra note 2, at vii (previously convicted inmates in confidential study self-reported
commission of over 20 crimes per year of "street time"); see also M. MALTZ, RECIDIVISM 12
(1984) (same). Congress has heard and acted on this data. See generally Hearings, supra note 2,
at 12 (Remarks of Senator Arlen Specter: "It need not be repeated, the tremendous problem
caused by the career criminals, where some 6 percent of the criminals in this country account for
some 70 percent of the crime •..."); id. at 37 (Remarks of Congressman Wyden: "[S]tudies
show that less than 10 percent of the criminal population commits more than two thirds of all
violent crime in America.").
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grams aimed at career criminals,4 and nearly all states have enacted
habitual-offender laws that increase prison terms for recidivists. 5 In
the past decade, the federal government has entered the fray.
The Armed Career Criminal Act of 19846 (ACCA) enables the
federal government to help state authorities more effectively prosecute
"career criminals.''7 The ACCA imposes a mandatory sentence of at
least fifteen years, and up to life imprisonment, for illegal possession of
4. See W. GAY & R. BoWERS, TARGETING LAW ENFORCEMENT REsoURCES 1-26 (1985)
(reviewing existing career criminal programs and instructing police agencies on how to develop
such programs); Crovitz, In Detroit, a Prosecutor Makes Street Crime a Federal Case, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 7, 1990, at A15, col. 3 (describing Detroit program coordinating state and federal police
and prosecution efforts against the "fewer than 2,500 criminals • • • responsible for the overwhelming majority of violent crime and drug trafficking'' in Detroit).
5. See L. SLEFFEL, THE LAW AND THE DANGEROUS CRIMINAL 1 (1977) (survey of state
recidivist statutes; most states have one or more in effect); Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions ofRecidivism, 96 HARV. L. REv. 511, 511 n.2 (1982) (as of 1979,
44 states had recidivist statutes in effect).
6. The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was originally codified at 18 U.S.C. app.
§ 1202(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The ACCA was amended and recodified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) by the Career Criminal Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 459
(Supp. IV 1986) (expanding the range of predicate convictions from robbery and burglary in the
1984 version to include any "violent felony or serious drug offense"). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 1056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4462 (1988) amended the original ACCA
by adding language requiring that the predicate offenses be "committed on occasions different
from one another."
Presently, the ACCA is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). It provides:
(e)(l) In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous
convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(l) of this title for a violent felony or a
serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and,
notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or
grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under section
922(g), and such person shall not be eligible for parole with respect to the sentence imposed
under this subsection.
(2) As used in this subsection (A) the term "serious drug offense" means (i) an offense under the Controlled Substance Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the
Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.) or the
first section or section 3 of Public Law 96-350 (21 U.S.C. 955a et seq.) for
which a maximum term of ten years or more is prescribed by law; or
(ii) an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for
which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed
by law; and
(B) the term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, or any act ofjuvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying
of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment
for such term if committed by an adult, that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.
(C) the term "conviction" includes a finding that a person has committed an act of
juvenile delinquency involving a violent felony.
7. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 10.

June 1991]

Note -

Counting Convictions

1953

a firearm. 8 by anyone who has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses "committed on occasions different from
one another." 9 The ACCA provides in part:
In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title [which
criminalizes possession of firearms by felons] and has three previous convictions by any court ... for a violent felony or serious drug offense, or
both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person
shall be . . . imprisoned not less than fifteen years and, notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of,
or grant a probationary sentence to, such person ... and such person
shall not be eligible for parole •... 10

To apply the ACCA, judges must determine first whether the defendant's prior convictions meet the definitions of "violent felony or serious drug offense," and secondly whether the offenses were committed
on different occasions so that they count separately toward armed career criminal status. This Note focuses on the latter analysis - conviction counting.
The ACCA implements a policy of "selective incapacitation." 11
That is, it singles out a special class of offenders for long periods of
incarceration. To the extent that the criminal justice system identifies
some criminals as unresponsive to rehabilitative treatment or deterrence, and expects them to offend again, the case for incapacitating
them - denying them the opportunity to commit crimes by locking
them up for long periods of time - is especially strong. 12 If the gov8. Federal law prohibits convicted felons from possessing a firearm which has been shipped
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce (which is tantamount to all firearms). 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (1988) provides in part:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person (1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year;
... to ship or transport ... or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammuni·
tion •...
9. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1988).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1988). For the full text of the ACCA, see supra note 6.
11. See M. GoTIFREDSON & T. HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 259-65 (1990); P.
GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION (1982); Note, supra note 5.
12. On the crime-reduction rationale supporting selective incapacitation policy, see P.
GREENWOOD & A. ABRAHAMSE, supra note 11, at 30-31; M. MALTZ, supra note 3, at 11-13;
Note, supra note 5, at 512. Crime reduction is not the only justification for sentence enhancement for career criminals. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 571 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part) (noting that recidivist statutes serve both incapacitation and retribution objectives); cf. SENTENCING 187-301 (H. Gross & A. von Hirsch eds. 1981)
(exploring the relationship between sentencing policy and the goals of the criminal law); Hart,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958). The purposes of the
criminal law are complex and interrelated. Implicit in the concept of "career criminals" is the
notion that since they are remorseless, and thus incapable of experiencing useful punishment,
they are probably beyond hope of deterrence or rehabilitation. The remaining goals of the criminal law, such as "the disablement of offenders [incapacitation], the sharpening of the community's sense of right and wrong, and the satisfaction of the community's sense of just retribution,"
can still be served if career criminals serve long sentences. Hart, supra, at 401. In sentence
enhancement legislation these goals are clearly paramount. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1988).

1954

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1951

ernment cannot expect to change these criminals' behavior, it can at
least isolate them and thereby protect society from their future
crimes. 13 In recent years, Congress and state legislatures have attempted to accomplish precisely that. A number of federal sentencing
laws enacted during the past decade impose enhanced sentences on
repeat offenders.14
The ACCA identifies career criminals on the basis of their prior
criminal records; it reaches those with the prescribed number and type
of prior convictions. Other federal incapacitation statutes operate in
similar ways. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), 15
13. See Note, supra note 5, at 512 (explaining rationale for incapacitation policy). The ability
to predict future criminality is a much debated subject. Several authorities deny the ability to
predict future criminal conduct in individual cases without unacceptably high rates of error. See
generally 3 AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE§ 18-3.2, at 223
& n.8 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (high rates of error common); S. KLEIN &
M. CAGGIANO, THE PREVALENCE, PREDICTABILITY, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RECIDIVISM 37 (1986) (five recognized predictive models proved only 5 to 10% more accurate than
mere chance in predicting postrelease crime commission); M. MALTZ, supra note 3, at 12 (predictions based on routinely collected criminal justice data showed over 50% misclassification
error); Dershowitz, The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 24, 46 (1971) (high rates of error common); von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct
and Preventive Confinement of Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 717, 727 (1972) (same);
Note, supra note 5, at 514-15 & n.21 (collecting studies showing error rates in predicting future
violent crime between 54 and 99%). Others assert that recidivism is predictable with sufficient
accuracy to justify its use in reaching policy decisions. See, e.g., P. SCHMIDT & A. WHITE, AN
EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 365-73 (1984) (overprediction error just 2.5%, n
"marked improvement over most previous attempts to predict recidivism"); E. VAN DEN HAAG,
PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CoNCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION 251 (1975) (recidivism predictable with "a high degree of probability").
Importantly, most of these studies have not confined their samples to offenders previously
convicted of three serious offenses. Error rates in analyses of first-time or second-time offenders
do not necessarily undermine the validity of classifications mnde under the ACCA. Indeed,
Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin found that the likelihood of recidivism increases ns the number of
prior convictions increases - the percentage of those with five prior offenses who commit a sixth
crime is greater than the percentage of those with one prior offense who commit n second, and so
on. M. WOLFGANG, supra note 3, at 65-70. Although Gottfredson and Hirschi argue against the
selective incapacitation of youthful offenders early in their careers, they note that "[a]t some
point, of course, almost any policy will suggest that multiple recidivists merit incarceration [for
long terms]." M. GoTTFREDSON & T. HIRSCHI, supra note 11, at 264. The ACCA, of course,
defines that point as three previous violent or serious drug offenses.
14. Especially in the past 15 years, Congress hns passed a number of statutes toughening
federal sentencing policy. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3551 (Supp. 1991),
completely redesign federal sentencing policy. See infra Parts III and IV; see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3147 (1988) (enhanced sentence for offenses committed while released on bail); 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b) (1988) (enhanced sentences for certain drug offenders). Since 1984, often to the chagrin
of federal judges who believe these laws work terrible injustice in some cases, each election year
has seen "mandatory minimum sentences ..• ratcheted upward in a drug-warring frenzy." See
Taylor, Ten Years for Two Ounces, AM. LAW., Mar. 1990, at 68.
15. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 (West Supp. 1991). The Guidelines apply to 90% of all felony and
Oass A misdemeanor cases in federal court. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, Ch. 1, Pt. A.5 (West Supp.
1991) (Introduction and General Application Principles). This Note addresses the interaction
between the Guidelines and the ACCA, so a basic explanation of the Guidelines is in order. In
cases under the Guidelines, judges determine sentences based on two factors: the offense level
and the criminal history category. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § lBl.1 (West Supp. 1991).
Chapter Two of the Guidelines contains a series of crime-specific sections that tell judges how
to compute the offense level. 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 §§ lBl.l(b), 2Al.1-2X5.1 (West Supp. 1991).
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which control most federal sentencing decisions, contain a "career offender" provision which enhances the sentences of recidivists with
qualifying conviction records. 16 As they do when applying the
Each specific crime has a "base offense level" which applies generically, and additional instructions to raise or lower the offense level by a certain amount if certain aggravating or mitigating
circumstances occurred ("specific offense characteristics"). 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 § lBl.l(b) (West
Supp. 1991). Thus, for the crime of kidnapping,§ 2A4.1 specifies a base offense level of24, and
directs the judge to increase the offense level to 28 if the victim "sustained permanent injury,"
and by another two levels, to 30, ifa "dangerous weapon" was used. 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 § 2A4.1
(West Supp. 1991).
Chapter Four of the Guidelines provides the rules for computing the second factor, the criminal history category. 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 §§ lBl.l(f), 4Al.1-4Bl.4 (West Supp. 1991). To simplify, the judge assesses the defendant a certain amount of "points" based on the number and
length of the defendant's prior sentences, and whether the instant crime was committed while on
parole or escape status or soon after release. 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 § 4Al.1 (West Supp. 1991). If,
for example, the kidnapper above had four prior sentences of more than one year, he would be
assessed three points for each of them, for a total of 12. And, if the kidnapping had been committed within two years of release from prison, the judge would add an additional two points,
raising the total to 14. Different point scores translate to one of the six criminal history categories (I-VI); fourteen "points" translates to category VI, the highest one. See 18 U.S.C.A app. 4
§ 4Al.1 & Ch. 5, Pt. A (West Supp. 1991) (Commentary and Sentencing Table).
The judge uses the offense level and criminal history category to determine the appropriate
sentencing range, expressed in months, from the Sentencing Table. 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 § lBl.l(g)
& Ch. 5, Pt. A (West Supp. 1991). The table is reproduced in part below:
SENTENCING TABLE

Criminal History Category

II

v

I
(0-1)

(2-3)

III
(4,5,6)

IV
(7,8,9)

(10,11,12)

VI
(13 or more)

1
2
3

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
2-8

0-6
1-7
3-9

29
30
31

87-108
97-121
108-135

97-121
108-135
121-151

108-135
121-151
135-168

121-151
135-168
151-188

140-175
151-188
168-210

151-188
168-210
188-265

37

210-262

235-293

262-327

292-365

324-405

360-life

Offense
Level

At the intersection of each criminal history category (columns I-VI) and offense level (43 total
rows), the table prescribes the permissible sentencing range. Thus, for a kidnapper with an offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of VI (14 points), the sentencing range is 168210 months imprisonment (bold type). Judges may impose sentences outside the prescribed
range only in limited, unusual circumstances. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 Ch. l, Pt. A.2 (West Supp.
1991) (Introduction) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)). By structuring the sentencing analysis
in this way, the Guidelines seek to curtail the tremendous discretion that formerly marked federal sentencing decisions and resulted in wide disparities. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 ch. 1, pt. A.3 (West
Supp. 1991). The foregoing explanation greatly simplifies the Guidelines in the interest of
quickly explaining the interaction of the offense level and criminal history to produce the sentence. Those aspects bear directly on the Guidelines' treatment of career offenders and the interface between the Guidelines and the ACCA. See infra Parts III and IV.
16. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.3 (West Supp. 1991). The Career Offender provision enhances
sentences by mandating the highest criminal history category (VI) and higher offense levels than
those that would normally apply (e.g.• the offense level becomes 37 for all offenses with a statutory maximum penalty of life imprisonment, and becomes 32 where the instant offense carries a
statutory maximum of 20 years). 18 U.S.C.A app. 4 § 4Bl.l (West Supp. 1991). The actual

1956

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1951

ACCA, courts applying the Guidelines must determine whether prior
convictions count separately toward sentence enhancement. 17 Similar
issues therefore arise when courts count prior convictions under the
ACCA and the Guidelines. is
To implement the ACCA, prosecutors and judges must apply the
statute's criminal history standard to accurately distinguish career
criminals from ordinary offenders. 19 The ACCA directs judges to enhance the sentence of ex-felons convicted of illegal possession of a firearm whenever the defendant has three previous convictions for violent
felonies or serious drug offenses committed on occasions different from
one another. This standard, when satisfied, triggers mandatory sentence enhancement - the ACCA does not allow parole, probation, or
suspended sentences.20 If courts interpret the standard too narrowly
and fail to identify a large number of offenders who will in fact commit
serious crimes again, the law will have little effect on crime.21 On the
other hand, if courts interpret the standard too broadly and capture
offenders who probably would not commit serious crimes again "false positives" who are not really career criminals22 - then other
problems will result. Judges will sentence misclassified offenders to
unjustly harsh terms, 23 which will further stretch prison resources for
no good reason.
Some commentators question whether an examination of prior
conviction history alone should suffice to classify individuals as career
criminals. Many think the judge should attempt a broader or more
rigorous analysis of each offender before the court. 24 For example,
judges could examine facts underlying the prior crimes: the degree of
violence involved, the relationship of the offender to the victims, or
similarities between offenses. The judge might also consider the persentence still comes from the sentencing table; the court simply applies the higher category and
level to find it in the table.
17. See infra Parts III-IV.
18. Id.
19. See M. GOTIFREDSON & T. HmscHI, supra note 11, at 259. No test or standard will be
completely accurate. See supra note 13.
20. 18 U.S.C. § 924{e)(l) (1988).
21. For example, an early version of the ACCA would have limited the predicate offenses to
violations of federal law such as bank robbery. Congress ultimately rejected that version as underinclusive. Critics successfully argued that such a standard would emasculate the ACCA because the law would reach only a few criminals, Le., 10% of the total armed robbers and none of
the burglars. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 38.
22. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
23. Some federal judges protest that recently passed federal mandatory minimum sentencing
laws enhancing the sentences of certain drug offenders force courts to impose absurdly long
sentences on false positives. "Most are undoubtedly real criminals. But many are marginal players with no prior criminal records - lookouts, drivers, 'mules.' " See Taylor, supra note 14, at
68. Even though all ACCA defendants, by definition, have prior criminal records, fears of this
sort are not completely allayed when the ACCA is applied. See infra Part II.
24. See infra note 50.
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sonal characteristics of the offenders: whether the defendants made
their living from crime, whether they demonstrate remorse, or the nature of their prior treatment. Other commentators, however, argue
that the conviction history alone provides the better test. 25
Another problem with the ACCA test appears with its practical
application. In close cases, the phrase "occasions different from one
another" proves ambiguous. It is unclear how Congress intended
judges to count convictions for offenses occurring within a short time
span - multiple burglaries on a single night, for example. The offenses could qualify as separate "occasions," each counting toward the
requisite three, or they could be considered part of a single criminal
occasion and thus count as a single conviction.26 The text of the
ACCA does not specify the elapsed time between offenses necessary to
delineate separately countable "occasions." Similarly, the ACCA does
not specify whether nontemporal factors such as a common criminal
scheme or a common victim matter to the determination of separate
occasions.
A problem thus arises because three-time offenders can differ dramatically in ways intuitively relevant to the determination whether or
not they are "career" criminals. Some defendants, for example, have
made round trips through the system - arrested, tried, convicted, and
punished - on three or more successive occasions. They more
strongly demonstrate resistance to treatment than those who have
served a single jail sentence. Defendants with a history of offenses
spanning several years more convincingly demonstrate a career of
crime than do those with a history of only three crimes committed
within a few weeks of one another. 27
25. See infra section l.B.
26. The word "occasion" is ambiguous here. One definition of "occasion" is "a situation or
set of circumstances favorable to a particular purpose," WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1560 (1986), which suggests same-night burglaries might be a single occasion. Alternately, "occasion" may be "a particular time at which something takes place," id.,
suggesting successive burglaries happen on different occasions.
27. The problem is best illustrated by two hypothetical examples not too far removed from
actual cases that have come before the courts. Compare United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192
(9th Cir. 1987) (same-night burglaries), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988) with United States v.
Uzelac, 921 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1990) (conviction based on possession of hunting weapons) and
United States v. Smeathers, 884 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). Suppose Defendant One has a
history that shows, in Year One, a robbery conviction and six months probation; in Year Three, a
burglary conviction and six months in prison; and in Year Five, two convictions under one indictment for armed robberies committed one week apart, resulting in concurrent prison sentences
of four years. In Year Nine, the defendant is convicted for an armed robbery, as well as for
possession of a sawed-off shotgun and pistol found in the trunk of the car. Clearly, Congress
intended for this offender to be sentenced to at least 15 years under the Armed Career Criminal
Act. The test - three or more convictions for serious crimes on different occasions - does not
give pause. This defendant is the stereotypical armed recidivist who has been through the "revolving door'' of the criminal justice system. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
Legal and moral problems arise when the ACCA defendant seems less threatening. See supra
note 23. Suppose Defendant Two was convicted in Year One for burglary of a warehouse and
immediately released on probation. Weeks later, a single indictment results in two convictions
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Where defendants' conviction records leave serious doubt about
whether they are in fact career criminals, some courts balk at sending
them to jail for fifteen years. These courts have developed approaches
to conviction counting that avoid application of the Act in all but the
most egregious cases.28 Critics find these approaches excessively lenient and underinclusive; they fail to capture criminals whom Congress
fully intended to incapacitate.29 Other courts enhance the sentence of
virtually any defendant whose predicate offenses occurred at distinct
times, even if only hours apart. 3° Critics argue that these courts employ overly mechanical definitions that lead to draconian sentences for
criminals who are almost certainly outside the small class of "career
criminals" which Congress targeted in the ACCA. 31 Between these
two approaches, some courts attempt to group related crimes into
criminal "episodes." 32 Since the statute does not define criminal episodes, these courts effectively reintroduce discretion into the application of a mandatory sentencing law - one designed fundamentally to
limit judicial discretion. 33
However troublesome the ACCA's language, Congress has articulated a prior-conviction-based test to identify career criminals and
commanded the courts to apply it at sentencing. Courts should interpret and apply such a concept uniformly to achieve fairness. 34 As described above, courts sometimes fail to do so with respect to
for burglarizing adjacent apartments on the same night, and a jail term of several months. For
the succeeding five years, his record shows not so much as a traffic citation. Then, in Year Six,
defendant is arrested in a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms crackdown. Defendant is
convicted for illegal possession of a hunting rifle, a gift from an employer. See Gonzalez, Trafficker's High-Powered Guns Put ATF in Middle of Drug Fight, Wash. Times, Dec. 20, 1989, at
BS, col. 1. Fifteen years without parole - the mandatory minimum sentence if defendant is
sentenced under the ACCA and its conviction counting test is literally applied - seems very
harsh in such a case.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1989) (requiring intervening
convictions between offenses; see infra section 11.B.3).
29. See, e.g., 873 F.2d at 685-88 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Wicks, 833 F.2d at 192 (relying on the distinction in time to count same-night
burglaries separately; see infra section 11.B.1).
31. See, e.g., 833 F.2d at 194-95 (Pregerson, J. dissenting).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989), (considering selected facts
underlying the crimes to group them into separate "episodes"; see infra section 11.B), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989).
33. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, § 18-4.4, at 285 (mandatory sentencing laws represent
legislature's attempts to curtail judicial discretion); see also infra note 156 and section 11.B.2,
discussing the discretion that arises in the criminal episodes approach.
34. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, Ch. 4, Pt. A.3 (West Supp. 1991) (Introduction to Guidelines);
see also Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2154-55 (1990). Ambiguous terms in criminal
statutes should be interpreted consistently to ensure uniform results in factually similar cases.
The problem has surfaced in parts of the ACCA other than the conviction counting problem.
The ambiguity of the term "burglary" in the ACCA - whether "breaking and entering" counts
as a "burglary," for example - also created disagreement between the circuits until resolved in

Taylor.
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conviction counting under the ACCA. 35 The various approaches to
conviction counting should be reconciled: (1) to conform judicial application of the law to probable congressional intent; (2) to improve
the uniformity of results between the federal circuits in factually similar cases; and (3) to bring the ACCA in accord with other federal
sentencing law, especially the more recent U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines.36
This Note suggests an interpretation of the ACCA which achieves
these goals. Part I examines the legislative history of the Armed Career Criminal Act relevant to the conviction counting problem. Part
II explores the different approaches courts take in counting prior convictions under the ACCA. Part III analyzes the "career offender"
concept and the conviction counting method recently articulated in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a much more comprehensive expression of federal sentencing policy than the Armed Career Criminal
Act. Part IV proposes that courts draw heavily on the Guidelines'
conviction counting principles when applying the ACCA.

I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

The history of the ACCA supports some limited conclusions as to
how Congress intended the courts to count convictions. Part I examines these conclusions in detail. First, interpretations should not narrow the reach of the ACCA so much as to sacrifice prosecutorial
leverage. Second, interpretations should not require individualized
factfinding, nor should they involve unfettered judicial discretion. Finally, the history supports the conclusion that Congress did not necessarily intend that a conviction history must demonstrate repeated
rehabilitative failures for the convictions to be counted separately.
The Armed Career Criminal Act was enacted in 1984 and
amended in 1986 and 1988.37 Courts searching for the precise meaning of the phrase "committed on occasions different from one another"
find no clear answer in the Act's legislative history. 38 Still, the legislative evidence of the Act's purposes and intended operation provides
some helpful clues.

A.

The Leveraging Principle

Congress intended the ACCA to add the power of the Federal
Government to the efforts of local prosecutors in dealing with habitual
criminals. The principal sponsors believed the ACCA would bolster
35.
36.
37.
38.

See infra Part II.
18 u.s.c. § 3553 (1988).
See supra note 6.
See z"nfra Part II.
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local prosecution efforts through the principle of "leveraging":39
The primary benefit of this legislation will not be the federal prosecution of criminals, but the leverage that the threat of federal prosecution
will give state prosecutions. The threat by the state prosecutor to move a
repeat offender's case to the federal level - where trials are conducted
on the average four times faster than in crowded state courts and where
the defendant would face a mandatory 15 year sentence - would significantly cut down on the growing tendency of defendants [in state court]
to file one delaying motion after another and otherwise attempt to circumvent the state judicial process [such as by judge-shopping].40
Ideally, prosecutors would exercise their discretion to seek enhanced
sentencing in federal court for only a few of their cases.41 The threat
of prosecution under the ACCA, however, would inspire all potential
ACCA defendants to agree to guilty pleas with stiffer sentences.42
The leverage concept bears on the conviction counting problem because it mitigates against narrowing the reach of the ACCA. Congress
expected prosecutorial discretion to limit significantly the number of
cases actually prosecuted under the ACCA. 43 Congress envisioned
only the more egregious cases as proper federal fodder. 44 Congress
intended, however, that courts interpret the ACCA in such a way that
it could be used as a threat against a much greater number of repeat
offenders than those actually prosecuted. Interpretations narrowing
the reach of the ACCA diminish the credibility of this threat. For
example, to require incarceration between convictions would remove
39. Hearings, supra note 2, at 10.
40. Id. at 19 (remarks of Sen. Specter).
41. Id. at 15.
42. Id. at 13.
43. The chief Senate sponsor, Senator Arlen Specter, explained the anticipated effect of the
legislation in terms of his experience as a Philadelphia prosecutor:
[The ACCA] could be a centerpiece [of a federal effort to fight crime] by providing leverage
for state prosecutors.
• . • [As a district attorney] I had some 500 career criminals on the docket • • • • Wit·
nesses would disappear, or memories would dim, or •.• they could work a plea bargain and,
notwithstanding a record of 5, 6, 7 armed robberies, 7, 8, 9, 10 burglaries, walk out of court
with probation •.. again, and again, and again over my strenuous protests ••• because the
judge shopping and moves for continuance were simply beyond the power of that judicial
system to control.
.•. [If prosecution under the ACCA] happened to a few of Philadelphia's career
criminals, there would be a mass rush for guilty pleas in the State courts, and ••• it is not
[overly] optimistic to predict that 300 or 400 of the balance of those 500 cases would result
in guilty pleas, and not with sentences of 15 years to life but with sentences of 10 years, or 12
years, much more than is being obtained at the present time. It is that leveraging which we
really seek to accomplish through the career criminal bill.
Id. at 13 (emphasis added); see also id. at 37 (remarks of the principal House sponsor, Rep. Ron
Wyden) ("Perhaps most important, this bill will give local prosecutors leverage.").
44. Prosecutors, who have wide discretion whether or not to prosecute recidivists under sentence enhancement laws, would determine which cases warranted ACCA prosecution. See id. at
13; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, § 18-4.4, at 285 n.35. In the states' experience, mandatory
sentencing laws have been characterized as merely transferring discretion from judges (who formerly sentenced as they saw fit) to prosecutors (who continue to charge as they see fit). See Id.,
§ 18-4.4, at 285; M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 1-13 (1973),
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from consideration any prior offenses that resulted in probation or suspended terms. Fortuitous prior treatment would operate as a license
to offend again with confidence that the ACCA could not apply. The
leverage concept mitigates against such a narrow reading of the conviction counting language.
Although the broadest possible interpretation of the ACCA45
would maximize leverage, competing considerations recognized by
Congress46 - administrative efficiency, the appropriate role of judicial
discretion, and avoiding arguably unjust sentences in anomalous cases,
for example - lead to judicial interpretations that narrow the reach of
the ACCA in varying degrees. 47 Any sound interpretation should permit justifiable results in close cases. At the same time, the ACCA
should cause nearly all three-time offenders to worry - they should
not be certain it cannot apply to them.

B. Accuracy Versus Equity: The Proper Scope of the Inquiry
Plainly, some judges think that the "mere" fact of three prior felonies, without more, does not a career criminal make. They hesitate,48
or simply refuse,49 to send someone to jail for fifteen years on that
basis alone. They would examine a defendant's history in more depth
than the text of the ACCA requires before identifying them as career
criminals. so
45. See infra section 11.B.1.
46. See, e.g., infra note 75 and accompanying text.
47. See infra sections 11.B.2 & 3.
48. E.g., United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 684 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J. concurring)
("[W]e must insist that the government prove convincingly that the crimes (and the episodes of
which they were part) were truly separate."). The hesitation is understandable in part because
mandatory fifteen·years·to-life sentences are so severe. Prior to enactment, the ABA warned that
mandatory (ACCA) sentences far out of proportion to the crime might violate the constitutional
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Hearings. supra note 2, at 79. So far, the
U.S. Supreme Court has disagreed, upholding some very stiff mandatory sentences for recidivists.
See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (Sentence of life imprisonment for three felony
bad check offenses under the Texas state recidivist statute did not violate eighth amendment.);
see also Note, The Anned Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute or New Offense?,
56 FORDHAM L. R.Ev. 1085, 1094 nn.58·62 (1988).
49. See, e.g., Balascsak. 873 F.2d at 683-84 (rejecting the statutory test, "committed on occasions different from one another," and refusing to enhance the sentence unless the conviction
history showed three rehabilitative failures in the form of intervening convictions).
50. Because courts have access to plenty of conflicting testimony, virtually any possible construction of the conviction counting language in the ACCA can find some support in the record.
See Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2160 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the
various contradictory views in the legislative record of the ACCA); see also United States v.
Herbert, 860 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he legislative history, like the statute itself, is
ambiguous."), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1070 (1989).
The committee testimony of the Assistant U.S. Attorney General of the Criminal Division,
Department of Justice, Mr. Stephen S. Trott, supports several competing views on conviction
counting. Trott described the class of offenders that he felt should be targeted for mandatory
minimum sentences:
These are people who have demonstrated, by virtue of their definition, that locking them
up and letting them go doesn't do any good. They go on again, you lock them up, you let
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The legislative history, however, strongly supports the notion that
judges applying the ACCA should confine their identification inquiry
to the conviction record - that is, to the description of prior offenses,
dates of conviction, and treatment. 51 Many criminologists studying
recidivism attempt to predict future criminality. 52 They construct
models that invariably examine several factors in addition to the
number and type of prior offenses - age and socioeconomic status, for
example - that tend to predict recidivism. 53 Error rates in these
models can be quite substantial; even the better models achieve only
seventy percent accuracy. 54 In stark contrast to the broad, multifactor
analysis that marks academic efforts, the ACCA as written classifies
career criminals based on a much na"ower set of facts - number,
type, and timing of prior convictions. While even the most rigorous
scientific models misclassify significant numbers of offenders, Congress
wrote the ACCA to consider even less information than do scientific
them go, it doesn't do any good, they are back for a third time. At that juncture, we should
say, "That's it; time out; it is all over. We, as responsible people, will never give you the
opportunity to do this again."
Hearings, supra note 2, at 64. Judge Pregerson, dissenting from the majority's straightforward
reading of the ACCA in Wicks, quoted the above portion of the Trott testimony verbatim, and
then concluded
Thus, it is clear that [the ACCA] is aimed at recidivists, not at individuals who commit
three acts that result in three convictions.
I would ••• hold that something more than three convictions is required •••• Here,
where two of the three convictions stemmed from burglaries that occurred on the same
night, I would hold that [the ACCA] was not intended to, and therefore does not, apply.
United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 195 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988). The
Trott quotation plausibly suggests that witness Trott envisi911ed three complete, successive cycles
through the system. "[L]ocking them up and letting them go doesn't do any good •••• [T]hey are
back for a third time" seems to describe three successive cycles of offense, conviction, incarcern·
tion, and release. Perhaps that is the "something more" Judge Pregerson would require to count
the convictions separately, since it would prove the defendant was, in his words, "resistant to
society's efforts at rehabilitation." 833 F.2d at 195.
However, Trott's testimony, taken as a whole, hardly supports Judge Pregerson's reluctance
to take the language at face value. In the next sentence after the passage quoted, Trott stated that
he felt a mandatory life sentence should be imposed on armed repeat offenders with histories such
as Wicks: "I have always believed for people who use firearms, who have demonstrated their
proclivities by a couple of convictions, that they should go away forever." Hearings, supra note 2,
at 64 (emphasis added).
51. In general, courts agree that the ACCA is designed to be easy for judges to apply. No
elaborate factfinding is contemplated at the sentence enhancement stage. See Taylor v. United
States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2160 (1990) ("We think the only plausible interpretation of [the ACCA]
is that ... it generally requires the trial court to look only to the fact of conviction and the
statutory definition of the prior offense."); see also United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 683
(1989) ("The supporters of the legislation cannot have contemplated an interpretation of the
statute which required for its application anything but a straightforward process. 'Ordinarily,
the proof will be in the form of certified court records •••.' ").
52. See, e.g., S. KLEIN & M CAGGIANO, supra note 13, at 37 (summarizing results of five
predictive models).
53. See, e.g., M. WOLFGANG, supra note 3, at 64 (examining residential and school moves,
education levels, I.Q., race, and socioeconomic status).
54. See J. PETERSILIA & s. TURNER, GUIDELINE·BASED JUSTICE 26 (1985) (the most accurate and sophisticated models achieve no better than 70% accuracy).
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models. The reasons for the narrower inquiry have as much to do
with fairness as accuracy.
In 1984, Congress conducted hearings on the bills that would become the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984.55 The definition and
scope of the career criminal problem, the leverage feature, resource
allocation issues, and predicate offense issues dominated the hearings;
methods for identifying career criminals did not figure prominently in
the discussion. 56 The American Bar Association (ABA) witness,
however, testified on the identification issue at some length. The ABA
witness, generally opposed to the ACCA, stated that scientific attempts to predict commission of specific dangerous crimes pose high
risks of false positives, but conceded that "recidivism in general is
often predictable."57 To identify proper subjects for sentence enhancement, the ABA recommended, courts should use a criminal history
test rather than "clinical or diagnostic"58 evaluations: "[T]he tendency toward overprediction in the clinical diagnosis of dangerousness
makes past criminal conduct the best and/airest guide to the determination of whom to incapacitate for an extended period ...." 59
The ABA did not here assert any superior predictive accuracy in a
conviction history test, but argued rather that such a test was more
fair. 60 The ACCA could have been written to direct judges to put all
convicted felons - not just those with three prior offenses - through
a battery of tests to "diagnose" the offender as a career criminal. To
avoid increased incarceration, the offender would have had to satisfy
the model designed by the diagnostician. The disadvantages of this
approach are twofold. First, scientific studies find that factors outside
the subjects' criminality - education, poverty, employment, and substance abuse, for example - correlate positively to recidivism.61 Such
factors introduce race and class bias into recidivism decisions. 62 Second, as noted above, models of this sort fail to predict recidivism with
high accuracy. Broad clinical analysis makes sentence enhancement
55. See Hearings, supra note 2 (hearings on H.R. 1627 and S. 52, House and Senate versions
of the ACCA).
56. See generally id.
57. Id. at 95 n.31.
58. Id. at 95.
59. Id. at 96 (emphasis added).
60. The ABA would also have increased the fairness of the ACCA by building in incremental
increases in punishment proportional to the number or quality of prior offenses. Id. at 79, 85.
The ACCA left the amount of any incremental increase above the minimum to the judge by
specifying only a broad sentencing range of 15 years to life. By comparison, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines specify incremental increases for each prior offense. See supra note 15; infra Part
III.
61. See J. PETERSILIA & S. TuRNER, supra note 54, at 25-27; see also M. WOLFGANG, supra
note 3, at 64.
62. See J. PETERSILIA & S. TuRNER, supra note 54, at 25 (Considering factors such as education, employment, and substance abuse introduces race and class bias into recidivism decisions.).
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turn not just on the defendant's behavior, but also on the diagnostician's mistakes and biases.
In contrast, the ACCA as written identifies career criminals based
solely on their own behavior. To avoid increased incarceration, the
offenders need only commit less than three felonies or not possess a
firearm. The latter approach proves "self-effectuating,"63 and thus
more fair than the former. The ACCA does not turn on factors
outside the defendant's volition.
The ABA's rationale for choosing a narrowly written criminal history test, unfortunately, is neither fully developed nor debated in the
history. Indeed, the identification issue was largely ignored in the discussion. Congress may well have chosen the narrower approach simply because it is cheaper and more certain. Regarding accuracy,
however, the equity rationale put to Congress by the ABA reasonably
explains the choice to consider less, rather than more information. 64
In sum, Congress was aware of the advantages and disadvantages
of broad versus narrow inquiry. The ABA recommended confining
the inquiry to the conviction record on grounds of equity. Broader
inquiry permits factfinders to introduce undesirable biases into the
identification process, gaining thereby only marginal improvements in
accuracy. A test considering less, but more certain, information is also
easier to administer than a more complex analysis. These reasons suggest conviction counting analysis should focus narrowly on the fact
and timing of prior convictions for serious offenses, to the exclusion of
other indicators of "career criminal" status. One such indicator, unmentioned in the ACCA but difficult for courts to ignore, is the extent
to which the defendant has demonstrated that further rehabilitation
would be useless. Section C examines this point in detail.
C.

The Sequence of Offenses and Convictions

Early drafts of the ACCA contemplated that defendants would
qualify for sentence enhancement only if they committed a third predicate offense, while armed, after having already been convicted of two
offenses: "Those career criminals with two or more prior convictions
for robbery or burglary who then carry a firearm while committing yet
another robbery or burglary will be eligible for prosecution in Federal
court [under the ACCA]." 65 State and local prosecutors balked at fed63. Concomitantly, the ABA would have limited the risks of inaccuracy by proportionately
increasing the incapacitative sentence by some specific percentage for each additional prior conviction. See supra note 60.
64. See supra note 6 (text of ACCA limits consideration to the number, type, and timing of
prior offenses).
65. S. REP. No. 190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) (emphasis added) (earlier draft of ACCA,
S. 52); see also S. 1688, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in 127 CoNG. REc. 26,449 (1981)
(defining career criminals as those who commit robbery or burglary "after having been twice
convicted of [a robbery or burglary felony]").
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eral prosecution of the traditionally local crimes of robbery and burglary. 66 The ACCA as it eventually emerged alleviated that concern,
since, under the enacted version, only the federal offense of illegal possession of a firearm is tried in federal court. 67 The total number of
predicate felonies remained at three, the same as in earlier versions.
The version of the ACCA finally enacted does not specify, as earlier drafts had, that at least two of the prior convictions must precede
commission of the third predicate offense. 68 Under earlier versions of
the bill, the Third Circuit has noted, "three burglaries on the same
night could not possibly subject a defendant to the fifteen-year
mandatory minimum."69 Earlier versions thus required intervening
convictions70 between countable offenses:
Given the narrow focus of the bill [on career criminals], the most reasonable interpretation would be to require the same relationship [as in the
earlier drafts of the bill]. That is, the first conviction must have been
rendered before the second crime was committed. The bill was aimed at a
small number of hard-core offenders, and was explicitly motivated by
concerns that some state courts operated as a "revolving door." 71

This interpretation reasonably construes the earlier draft. The enacted
version, however, does not imply that each offense must follow a prior
conviction. The ACCA simply requires that three prior convictions
precede the firearm possession offense.72 Moreover, given the most
recent amendment to the ACCA, interpreting the ACCA to require
intervening convictions seems plainly wrong.
In 1988, Congress amended the ACCA to add the proviso that the
three predicate offenses must have been "committed on occasions different from one another." 73 The amendment appears to have been
66. H.R. REP. No. 1073, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CooE CoNG. &
NEWS 3661, 3664-65 (1984); see also United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 679-81
(3d Cir. 1989) (discussing federalism concerns attending early drafts of ACCA).
67. Originally codified alongside the ACCA at 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a) (Supp. 1985), the
federal law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms is now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(1988). See text of§ 922(g), supra note 8.
68. See Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 681 (pointing to the discrepancy).
69. 873 F.2d at 681 (citing S.1688, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 127 CoNG. REc. 26,449
(1981)).
70. See infra section II.B.3 (discussing the Third Circuit's "intervening convictions" approach in United States v. Ba/ascsak).
71. Ba/ascsak, 873 F.2d at 682 (quoting S. REP. No. 190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988). It is not clear from the record that Congress changed the
earlier language for conviction counting purposes. The relevant text was probably redrafted only
to alleviate federalism concerns. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. The enacted
version added a federal crime, felony firearm possession, supra note 8, so that traditionally local
crimes (e.g., burglary) would not be tried in federal court; that idea had troubled state prosecutors. The ACCA kept the total number of substantive prior offenses the same (three) as in earlier
versions. The enacted version, supra note 6, simply requires all three prior convictions to have
been committed before the federal firearm offense.
73. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402 (1988)
(amending the ACCA).
AoMIN.

1966

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 89:1951

drafted in direct response to United States v. Petty, 14 where the court
counted separately six convictions stemming from the simultaneous
robbery of six restaurant patrons. Explaining the change intended by
the amendment, the Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman, Senator
Joseph Biden, explained:
Under the amendment, the three previous convictions would have to be
for offenses "committed [on] occasions different from one another."
Thus, a single multicount conviction could still qualify where the counts
related to crimes committed on different occasions, but a robbery of multiple victims simultaneously (as in Petty) would count as only one conviction. This interpretation plainly expresses that concept of what is
meant by a "career criminal," that is, a person who over the course oftime
commits three or more of the enumerated kinds of felonies and is convicted therefor. It is appropriate to clarify the statute . . . to insure that
its rigorous sentencing provisions apply only as intended in cases meriting such strict punishment.1 s

As a practical matter, the government routinely prosecutes defendants
charged with multiple offenses under multiple-count indictments. 76
Senator Biden's remarks recognize this practice and explain that the
ACCA requires a difference in time between crimes, but not sequential
prosecutions. By comparison, under an intervening convictions approach, offenses treated in a multicount indictment could not possibly
qualify since the convictions are all returned at the same time. If, as
Senator Biden explains, multicount convictions can still qualify, then
it follows that the ACCA may be applied to defendants who commit
three serious crimes over some period of time, with or without intervening efforts at rehabilitation.11
Although the Biden remarks largely discount the "intervening
convictions" interpretation of the ACCA, they fail to specify how
much time is required to separate sequential offenses into distinct,
countable "occasions." Courts diverge in their approach to that
question. 78
To summarize, the legislative history of the ACCA has been used
to support vastly different results. 79 On balance, the history of the Act
seems most valuable at telling us how it should not be construed.
74. 798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 481 U.S. 1034, revd., 828 F.2d 2 (8th Cir. 1987);

see infra section II.A.
75. 134 CoNG. REC. S17,370 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Biden) (emphasis
added).
76. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURS 993
(1990).
77. Accord United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 687-88 (3d Cir. 1988) (Greenberg, J.,
dissenting).
78. See infra section 11.B.
79. Compare United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987) (different times of commission sufficient), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988), with Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 678-81 (intervening
convictions required) and United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989) (continuity of
conduct and number of victims relevant), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989).
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First, courts should narrow the reach of the ACCA as little as possible, since the fundamental principle upon which the Act is based affording state and local prosecutors leverage in the form of a swift,
certain, and severe federal sentencing alternative - would be undermined if courts interpret the Act in such a way that many criminals
know it cannot reach them. Second, Congress rejected extensive, individualized fact-finding as a means of improving accuracy and thus
minimizing the risk of false positives. The ACCA contemplates an
examination of the conviction record, and little else. The idea of
broader diagnostic analysis was put before Congress, as were the fairness and proportionality advantages of a criminal history focus; it
chose the latter approach. Finally, convictions returned under multiple-count indictments can be counted separately provided the offenses
were committed on different "occasions." Thus, the statute cannot
logically require intervening efforts at rehabilitation.
The legislative history does not address satisfactorily how much
time between offenses, if any, is required to count the convictions separately. "Committed on different occasions" means at least "nonsimultaneous,"80 but how far beyond remains unclear. One offense
may be viewed as happening on an "occasion" different from that of
another committed five minutes later. 81 Five minutes seems like too
short a career to warrant the consequences of career criminal sentence
enhancement. The rule of lenity dictates that courts should construe
criminal statutes, including sentencing provisions, in favor of the accused. 82 At the same time, application of the rule of lenity "cannot
dictate an implausible interpretation of a statute, nor one at odds with
the generally accepted contemporary meaning of a term." 83 The questions are whether courts should draw a bright line at all, and if not,
what the standard should be.
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO CONVICTION COUNTING

Courts applying the ACCA count convictions in a number of
ways. Multiple simultaneous offenses count as a single conviction for
sentence enhancement purposes. 84 Where offenses have occurred over
time, however, courts differ in their approaches. Some courts count
each offense as a different occasion regardless of the time span, so long
as the crimes were temporally distinct. 85 Others attempt to group the
80. See infra section II.A.
81. See supra note 26.
82. Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2157 (1990) (discussing the appropriate construction of the term "burglary" as used in the ACCA and citing Bifulco v. United States, 447
U.S. 381 (1980), for the rule of lenity in construction of criminal statutes).
83. Taylor, 110 S. Ct. at 2157 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 49 n.13).
84. See infra section II.A.
85. See infra section II.B.1.
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underlying offenses into factually related criminal episodes and count
these episodes separately. 86 Still others count only offenses separated
by sequentially corresponding intervening convictions. 87 In all cases
the courts struggle to avoid under- and overinclusive interpretations.
The problem arises most often in situations where the defendant
has three or more prior convictions, but committed some or all of the
crimes either simultaneously or nearly so. Courts must sometimes
classify defendants who committed some of their offenses over a period
of hours or days-multiple burglaries in a single night, for example. 88
Here, reasonable observers may doubt that the defendant makes his
living from crime, or cannot be rehabilitated, or both. 89 Representative cases illustrate the divergent approaches to the problem.
A. Simultaneous Offenses
In United States v. Petty, 90 the defendant had been convicted previously of one count of armed robbery in Missouri, and later, of six
counts of armed robbery under a single indictment in New York. 91
The New York convictions were for the simultaneous robberies of six
persons in a restaurant. 92 Upon his subsequent conviction in federal
court for drug trafficking and felony gun possession violations, the
trial judge enhanced Petty's sentence pursuant to the ACCA. 93 On
appeal, Petty contended that his New York prior convictions should
count as only one conviction for ACCA purposes since he was charged
under a single indictment and served the six sentences concurrently. 94
86. See infra section 11.B.2.
87. See infra section 11.B.3.
88. See e.g., United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), (two burglaries committed
a short time apart on the same night), cert denied, 488 U.S. 83 (1988); United States v. Petty,
798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1986) (simultaneous robberies of six restaurant patrons), vacated, 481
U.S. 1034, revd., 828 F.2d 2 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Greene, 810 F.2d 999 (11th Cir.
1986) (four burglaries of four separate buildings within a four day period), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
1322 (1990).
89. For instance, the defendant's criminal activity might be the product of some unusual, but
temporary, lapse. In the extreme, the well-worn hypothetical of the parent stealing a loaf of
bread for the children comes to mind. A more realistic example might be the single drunken or
drugged night of crime - resulting in three or more convictions for multiple distinct offenses.
Of course, prosecutorial discretion may filter out many of the most dramatic cases. Whether
such discretion is a sufficient safeguard against overinclusive application of sentence enhance·
ment laws lies outside the scope of this Note. For a comprehensive treatment of the general
subject of prosecutorial discretion, see B. ATKINS & M. POGREBIN, THE INVISIBLE JumcE
SYSTEM: DISCRETION AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1982).
90. United States v. Petty, 798 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated, 481 U.S. 1034, on remand
828 F.2d 2 (8th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1057 (1988).
91. 798 F.2d at 1159.
92. 798 F.2d at 1159-60. While the court describes Petty's robberies of restaurant patrons as
"simultaneous," it is unclear whether he robbed the victims all at the same time, or one after the
other.
93. 798 F.2d at 1159.
94. 798 F.2d at 1160.
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Unpersuaded, the Eighth Circuit upheld the enhanced sentence, reasoning that statutorily mandated indictment and concurrent sentencing procedures had no bearing on the essential fact that the New York
robberies resulted in loss to six different victims and therefore constituted six different offenses.95
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether
the six New York convictions had been counted properly.96 The
Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the Eighth Circuit for
reconsideration in view of the position asserted by the Solicitor General. 97 In his brief, the Solicitor General urged that offenses should be
counted separately only if they occurred at different times, and that
the statute, properly interpreted, bases the career criminal classification on a history of "multiple criminal episodes" rather than multiple
convictions arising from a single "episode."98 On remand, the Eighth
Circuit accepted the argument of the Solicitor General, holding that
Petty's simultaneous robberies constituted one criminal episode:
"[T]he legislative history strongly supports the conclusion that the
statute was intended to reach multiple criminal episodes that were distinct in time, not multiple felony convictions arising out of a single
criminal episode. "99
The Petty case stands for the general proposition that criminal
acts, irrespective of quantity or quality, must occur over time to justify
enhanced sentencing of the convict as a career criminal. 100 With Petty
in mind, Congress in 1988 amended the ACCA to require that the
predicate convictions be committed on different occasions. 101 In the
95. 798 F.2d at 1160.
96. Petty v. United States, 481 U.S. 1034 (1987).
97. 481 U.S. at 1034-35.
98. See United States v. Petty, 828 F.2d 2, 3 (8th Cir. 1987).
99. 828 F.2d at 3. The court vacated the original 22-year enhanced sentence and remanded
to the trial court for resentencing on the applicable count. 828 F.2d at 3.
100. See 828 F.2d at 3. The opinion is narrowly written, and avoids discussion of what the
difference in time between offenses must be in order to properly count the offenses separately. It
seems wrong that Petty would be any more the "career criminal" had he, for example, stationed
himself in the restaurant lobby and robbed six patrons sequentially, at distinct times, as they
happened into the restaurant. However, the opinion, as well as the amendment this case inspired, supra note 101, taken literally, may allow just such a result.
101. See supra note 6. Commenting on the 1988 amendment to the ACCA, Senator Biden
retold the Petty case history and remarked:
The proposed amendment clarifies the armed career criminal statute to reflect the Solicitor General's construction and to bring the statute in conformity with the other [federal]
enhanced penalty provisions . • . • Under the amendment, the three previous convictions
would have to be for offenses "committed [on] ~ions different from one another." Thus,
a single multicount conviction could still qualify where the counts related to crimes committed on different occasions, but a robbery of multiple victims simultaneously (as in Petty)
would count as only one conviction. This interpretation plainly expresses that concept of
what is meant by a "career criminal," that is, a person who over the course of time commits
three or more of the enumerated kinds offelonies and is convicted therefor.
134 CoNG. REc. 817,370 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Biden) (emphasis added).
Two readings of this commentary are possible. One could infer from Senator Biden's explicit
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rare situation of truly simultaneous offenses, this principle is easy to
apply and draws no quarrel.102

B. Nonsimultaneous Offenses
Judges disagree on how to apply the ACCA where the predicate
offenses are committed at different times within a short period. The
statute remains ambiguous under these circumstances. 103 The amending proviso, requiring that the offenses be committed on "occasions
different from one another," may allow even minor differences in time
between offenses to trigger the ACCA. 104 In contrast, the standard
urged by the Solicitor General in the Petty case, requiring three or
more "multiple criminal episodes, " 105 plausibly suggests that a spree of
criminal activity, in which several offenses are committed over aperiod of time, but are in some sense connected, should not trigger the
ACCA. 106 Not surprisingly, in cases involving connected offenses,
courts resolve the ambiguity with inconsistent results. Some courts
rely on the distinction in time and enhance the sentence. Others, however, consider nontemporal linkages between offenses or require intervening convictions before enhancing the sentence.101
1. Distinct in Time
In United States v. Wicks, 108 the defendant had three prior burglary convictions, two of them for burglaries committed on the same
night. 109 Wicks was convicted for the two same-night burglaries
under a single indictment and served concurrent sentences. 110 The
reference to Petty that any measurable difference in time between offenses, that is, any non·
simultaneous offenses, should count toward career criminal status. On the other hand, Senator
Biden's statement that single multicount convictions "could still qualify" when the offenses are
committed "on different occasions," "over the course of time," could mean that such a pattern of
convictions may, but does not necessarily have to be counted, as in circumstances where the
defendant appears not to be a "career criminal." Id. (emphasis added).
102. The 1988 amendment clearly means that simultaneous offenses, as illustrated by Petty,
count as a single conviction for ACCA purposes. As might be expected, the much more common
situation is that in which the offenses are distinct, but close in time. As shown infra in section
Il.B.1, the correct approach in these cases is not clear. Petty nonetheless bears on the "non·
simultaneous" conviction counting problem because, among other things, it acknowledges the
difficulty of articulating a standard to capture "that concept of what is meant by 'career crimi·
nal.'" 134 CoNG. REc. S17,370 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Biden).
103. See supra note 26 ("occasions" susceptible to different interpretations).
104. Id. This construction supports the approach taken by the court in United States v.
Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988), discussed infra at section
11.B.l.
105. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
106. This is essentially the approach taken by the court in United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d
880 (2d Cir. 1989), discussed infra at section 11.B.2.
107. See infra sections 11.B.2 and 11.B.3.
108. 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988).
109. 833 F.2d at 193.
110. 833 F.2d at 193.
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trial court counted the convictions separately. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that, although close in time, the two burglaries were
committed at "two different places at two different times." 111 The
Court of Appeals distinguished Petty on the ground that, in Petty, the
convictions were for "simultaneous" rather than "distinct in time" offenses.112 Wicks' mechanical ruling suggests that any difference in
time between crimes, even a few hours, meets the "multiple criminal
episodes . . . distinct in time" requirement adopted in Petty. 113 The
Wicks majority relied on this temporal distinction for its result, but
also noted the differences in location and victims between offenses. 114
The majority explicitly rejected Wicks' argument that the statute
should not be applied because he had only been punished, in effect,
twice, and therefore did not demonstrate the resistance to rehabilitation that the statute aimed to treat. 115 In a dissent, however, Judge
Pregerson agreed with Wicks. He argued that the court should not
construe the statute literally in view of the evidence of a legislative
intent to target "individuals who are resistant to society's efforts at
rehabilitation." 116 Judge Pregerson would have required something
more than mere evidence of three convictions to find offenses distinct
in time. 117
The majority's "distinct in time" approach essentially interprets
language such as "different occasions" and "multiple episodes" to
mean simply "nonsimultaneous." This approach can impose harsh
sentences even in cases where all three prior offenses were committed
within hours of one another. 118 As evidence of "career criminal" status, such a fact pattern differs dramatically from the case where the
offenses occur over a long period of time and more convincingly
demonstrate a criminal career. 119 Where the defendant's prior conviction history consists of only three offenses in the same night, 120 a rigid
111. 833 F.2d at 194.
112. See 833 F.2d at 194 (arguing that distinctions in time alone can satisfy the criminal
episodes test).
113. 833 F.2d at 194.
114. 833 F.2d at 194.
115. 833 F.2d at 193.
116. 833 F.2d at 195 (Pregerson, J. dissenting); see infra section 11.B.3. (discussing the Third
Circuit's intervening-convictions approach).
117. 833 F.2d at 194-95; see also supra note 50 (discussing Judge Pregerson's use of the
legislative history).
118. See 833 F.2d at 194. Under the court's reasoning, Wicks would just as propedy have
received an enhanced sentence had all three of his burglaries been committed minutes apart in
adjacent buildings. It is doubtful that Congress intended such a brief period of criminal activity
to result in armed career criminal treatment. See 833 F.2d at 195 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
119. See 833 F.2d at 195 (Pregerson, J. dissenting) ("The title of the Act indicates that it was
aimed at career criminals, rather than those who merely commit three punishable acts. . . • More
was required.").
120. See United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 683 (3d Cir. 1989) ("We could hardly
attribute to Congress the intention of branding someone a career criminal offender who, for
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"distinct in time" approach is overinclusive. This concern, however,
diminishes where only a portion of the prior offenses appear related.
For example, two burglaries in one night, followed by two more several months later, fairly undercut the notion of an isolated spree.
2. Multiple Criminal Episodes
In United States v. Towne, 121 the Second Circuit rejected the
mechanical approach of the Wicks majority and attempted to group
offenses into "criminal episodes." In 1976, Towne was convicted on
two felony counts of kidnapping, and later sexually assaulting, a single
victim. 122 Then, in 1983, in exchange for the dropping of an outstanding 1979 New Hampshire rape charge, Towne pled guilty in Vermont
to two counts of sexual assault and kidnapping, again committed upon
a single victim. 123 In 1986, Towne was the prime suspect in the disappearance of a fifteen-year-old girl; the investigation of that crime led to
his arrest and conviction on felony firearms charges. 124 The trial court
enhanced Towne's sentence under the ACCA, counting the sexual assaults and kidnappings as four separate convictions. 125
On appeal, the government argued that the lower court had
counted Towne's four convictions properly because kidnapping and
rape "have very different elements, protect discrete interests, [and] do
not inevitably occur together." 126 The Second Circuit rejected this argument, holding:
[U]nder the circumstances of this case, in each instance the kidnap·
ping and rape offenses were part of a continuous course of conduct which
was directed against a single victim.... [U]nlike other cases cited by the
appellee, where a convicted defendant had committed separate crimes
against separate victims in separate locations [Wicks and Greene cited]
we consider each of these two attacks to be a single criminal episode. 127

Having determined that only two criminal episodes existed in these
facts, the court vacated the portion of the lower court's ruling enhancing Towne's sentence under the ACCA.12s
example, committed several separate felonies during a single drunken spree, with no time to
sober up and reconsider between the separate incidents.").
121. 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101 (1989).
122. 870 F.2d at 889.
123. 870 F.2d at 882.
124. 870 F.2d at 882-83.
125. 870 F.2d at 888-89.
126. 870 F.2d at 891 (quoting the U.S. Attorney for the District of Vermont).
127. 870 F.2d at 891.
128. 870 F.2d at 891. Much of the difficulty with this decision lies in the language used to
explain the result. Hypothetically, Towne might have, on one of the occasions, in the same
period of time, kidnapped not one, but two women (at the same time) and later sexually assaulted
them both. There would be two victims then, as opposed to a "single victim," but it is not clear
what light that sheds on Towne's status as a "career criminal." Similarly, suppose the abductee
escaped before Towne could assault her, but he returned several hours, or days, or weeks later,

June 1991]

Note -

Counting Convictions

1973

By comparison, the Wicks opinion suggests enhancement would
have been appropriate, since Towne committed his offenses at different
times and locations. 129 Further, although Wicks presents overinclusion risks by looking only to the fact of nonsimultaneous convictions,
the Towne court's refusal to enhance the sentence for multiple offenses
against a single victim presents underinclusion problems. 130 The
Towne approach looks beyond the fact and timing of convictions to the
facts underlying the convictions, deciding on its own their relevance to
whether the defendant is a career criminal. 131
In effect, Towne reintroduces discretion into the sentencing decision by leaving the boundaries and rules of the "episode" inquiry to
the judge. The court can circumvent Congress' standard by choosing
and then assaulted her. Such circumstances change the "single prolonged attack" characterization, but would hardly show Towne to be any more of a "career criminal" than he was in his
actual attacks.
129. Compare United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 831 (1988) with Towne, 870 F.2d at 891. Because Towne, like Wicks, committed two different offenses (kidnapping and sexual assault) at two different places (the site of the abduction
versus the site of the sexual assault) at two different times (kidnapping, then later sexually assaulting his victims), under the Wicks analysis he would qualify for enhanced sentencing. However, the Towne court distinguished Wicks on the ground that Wicks "had committed separate
crimes against separate victims in separate locations." Towne, 870 F.2d at 891 (emphasis added).
The distinction hardly seems dispositive.
130. The Towne opinion suggests that the court would not enhance a sentence where the
"offenses were part of a continuous course of conduct which was directed against a single victim." Towne, 870 F.2d at 891 (emphasis omitted). This portion of the court's reasoning seems
too narrow, since it is quite plausible that a criminal could make a "career" (or at least part of
one) out of repeated offenses against a single victim. For example, a burglar might steal from the
same warehouse night after night, or a bully might beat the same victim time after time. While
those situations may differ from Towne in the elapsed time between offenses, it is hardly clear
from the Towne decision that Towne would have qualified for enhanced sentencing had the interval between the kidnappings and the subsequent sexual assaults been separated by a similar
length of time. Perhaps the rationale behind the Towne opinion is that since there was no discernible break in the defendant's criminal activity between the time of the kidnappings and the
sexual assaults the offenses blend together in time. This undifferentiated continuity of criminal
activity might distinguish Towne from Wicks. See supra section 11.B.1 (Wicks' burglaries were
separated by a discernible, if brief, break in time between offenses.). Also, the fact Towne's
offenses occurred with no break in criminal activity may mean Towne lacked the requisite "time
to sober up and reconsider between the separate incidents" suggested in United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 683 (3d Cir. 1989). On the other hand, he undoubtedly could have abandoned
his prolonged attack at some time during its course.
131. Once factors other than the number, type, and timing of the prior offenses enter the
analysis, judicial discretion figures prominently in the analysis. Since the statute doesn't specify
any additional factors for consideration, the court decides them on its own. The sentencing
decision begins to resemble the traditional discretionary approach. See M. FRANKEL, supra note
44, at 21-25. The Towne court looked at the number of victims and the "prolonged" character of
the attacks, and declined to enhance Towne's sentence. It might just as easily have considered
the repetitive nature ofTowne's offenses (similar violent sexual assaults), the fact he had failed in
an intensive rehabilitation program specifically aimed at sex offenders, and the fact his initial
crime in each offense (kidnapping) preceded the subsequent sexual assaults by enough time to
force the victims to drive to secluded locations, affording Towne a reasonable opportunity to
desist. Discretion applied along the latter lines thus might reverse the results in Towne and
Wicks. Compare this discretion with the discretionary departure provisions in the federal sentencing guidelines, infra Part III.
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as it wishes from the plausible reasons for finding, or not finding, a
single criminal episode. Without statutory guidance, the "episode"
idea is just as ambiguous as the "occasion" and "career criminal"
concepts.
The Towne court approvingly cited the dissent in Wicks, which
noted that "the title of the Act itself indicates that it was aimed at
punishing 'career' criminals, 'individuals who are resistant to society's
efforts at rehabilitation.' " 132 The Wicks dissenter thus hints that
courts should not restrict their inquiry to the number, substance, and
timing of convictions, but also should assess how many unsuccessful
"efforts at rehabilitation" the prospective career criminal defendant
has been afforded. This idea is central to the third approach to counting convictions.
3. Intervening Convictions

In United States v. Balascsak. 133 the defendant was tried and convicted of illegally purchasing a gun as an ex-felon. In May of 1981,
Balascsak. had been convicted ofburglary. 134 Months later, in November of 1981, he was convicted of two more crimes: burglaries of two
different houses one block apart on the same night. 135 The pattern of
offenses closely resembles that in Wicks. 136 Acting consistently with
the Wicks "distinct in time" approach, the trial court enhanced the
sentence. 137
On appeal, the Third Circuit declined to follow the approaches
taken by other circuits and virtually disregarded the 1988 amendment.
"Distinct in time," "criminal episodes," and "committed on occasions different from one another" [phrases taken from Petty, Wicks,
Towne, and the language of the 1988 amendment to the ACCA] are malleable standards. . . . We could hardly attribute to Congress the intention of branding someone a career criminal offender who, for example,
committed several separate felonies during a single drunken spree, with
no time to sober up and reconsider between the separate incidents. 138
132. Towne, 810 F.2d at 891 (quoting Wicks. 833 F.2d at 195 (Pregerson, J., dissenting)).
133. 873 F.2d 673 (3d Cir. 1989).
134. 873 F.2d at 675.
135. 873 F.2d at 675.
136. See United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831
(1988).
137. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 676. Balascsak was convicted under the earlier version of the
ACCA, 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). That version did not contain the "committed on occasions different from one another" language added by the 1988 amendment to the
current version of the ACCA. See discussion of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, § 7056, 102 Stat. 4181, 4402 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 1501-09 (1988)
(amending the Armed Career Criminal Act). However, the Balascsak court was aware of the
added language at the time it considered the Act's application to the instant case. See Balascsak,
873 F.2d at 688 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
138. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 683. The Balascsak court vociferously criticized the Wicks ma-
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The court examined the legislative history at length and decided
that Congress meant to target a small number of high-rate offenders
incapable ofrehabilitation.. 139 The court adopted the conviction counting method used in most state habitual-offender statutes. Most state
schemes require that each successive felony must be committed after
the previous felony conviction in order to count toward habitual-offender status. 140 The Balascsak majority held that the ACCA requires
that each counted offense occur after a preceding conviction. 141
Balascsak's offense/conviction pattern, arrayed chronologically, was:
Offense 1, Conviction 1, Offense 2, Offense 3, Conviction 2, Conviction
3. Thus, offenses 2 and 3, the burglaries committed on the same night,
only counted as one occasion. 142
This approach may often prove underinclusive. Courts taking this
view will not enhance sentences even if the string of offenses spans
days, weeks, or months unless it is broken by intervening convictions.143 Absent intervening convictions, the offenses - no matter
how indicative of a criminal career - do not count separately. 144 This
jority's reliance on the distinction in time between offenses as sufficient reason to trigger the
ACCA:
The Wicks majority held that two burglaries committed on the same night in two different
locations are "distinct in time" and therefore may be counted as multiple convictions. Thus
the Wicks court would rely on small temporal distinctions without considering the underlying purpose of the statute; precisely the interpretation the Solicitor General suggested was
improper.
873 F.2d at 683. The Balascak majority went on to state that a "criminal episode" test (precisely
the interpretation the Solicitor General suggested was proper) or a "committed on occasions
different from one another" standard (precisely the language of the 1988 amendment) are
"hardly more satisfactory" than the Wicks temporal test. 873 F.2d at 683. The court opined
that these tests would all require an "evidentiary hearing" to "give factual content to the
phrase." 873 F.2d at 683. Further, in view of the fact that the legislative history suggests that
proof of the underlying convictions would "[o]rdinarily •.• be in the form of certified court
records," the court concluded that the drafters "cannot have contemplated an interpretation of
the statute which required for its application anything but a straightforward process." 873 F.2d
at 683 (quoting S. REP. No. 585, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, at 78 (1982)). Accordingly, the court
rejected any test which would require it to "evaluat[e] the precise temporal, spatial, or jurisprudential relationship between two crimes." 873 F.2d at 684.
139. Balascsak, 813 F.2d at 679-82. Evidence of such purpose was to be found in metaphors
such as "revolving door'' and "three-time loser" used in the legislative record. "The sort of
'three-time loser' which the supporters of the bill had in mind is one who is convicted of one
crime, then commits a second, and then commits a third." 873 F.2d at 682 (citing S. REP. No.
190, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, at 6 (1983)).
140. 873 F.2d at 682 ("[T]he rule followed in the majority of jurisdictions is that each successive felony must be committed after the previous felony conviction in order to eount toward
habitual criminal status.") (quoting State v. Carlson, 560 P.2d 26, 29 (Alaska 1977)).
141. Balascsak, 813 F.2d at 683-84.
142. Balascsak, 813 F.2d at 684.
143. In essence, the Balascak approach captures career criminals who are apprehended and
convicted more frequently, and passes over those who are brought to justice less frequently but who are logically as much "career criminals" as the former group. See United States v.
Herbert, 860 F.2d 620, 622 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Logically, a person who is convicted in a single trial
for multiple felonies committed on separate occasions could be classified as an 'habitual offender'
or 'career criminal.' "), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1070 (1989).
144. The concurring judge in Balascsak pointed out that several offenses without intervening
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approach might pass over bona fide career criminals who are successful in avoiding convictions for long periods of time. Many of the most
dangerous career criminals - mob bosses, drug kingpins, and master
thieves, for example - whose long patterns of crime often come to
light only after lengthy investigations which culminate in multicount
indictments, would escape enhanced sentencing, while their clumsier,
more exposed, more easily caught underlings would not. t4s
Even more problematically, the Balascsak approach all but rewrites the present version of the statute. Congress could easily have
included an intervening convictions scheme modeled on state habitualoffender laws in the ACCA had it wished to do so. Yet the text of the
statute requires simply that the offenses be committed on different occasions, and suggests that Congress wanted a much more inclusive
rule than state schemes provide. 146
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Balascsak amplify the
differences between the majority's intervening convictions standard,
the multiple episodes approach, and the distinct in time approach.
Judge Becker's concurring opinion urges the multiple criminal episodes approach. He argues that the "intervening convictions" approach goes too far, but that the "criminal episode requirement must
be read rigorously and that we must insist that the government prove
convincingly that the crimes (and the episodes of which they were
part) were truly separate." 147 Judge Becker recognized, however, the
convictions could demonstrate career criminal status sufficient to trigger the Act. 873 F.2d at
684-85 (Becker, J., concurring); see also 873 F.2d at 687 & n.4 (Greenberg, J., dissenting) (pointing out that labels such as "career criminal" and "repeat offender" apply equally "to those who
commit three crimes without any intervening convictions as to those who go through the judicial
and penal systems between crimes," and that the majority's "reconstruction" of the ACCA
would have the wrong effect of allowing felons who are repeatedly arrested, but whose prosecutions are delayed, to avoid enhanced sentencing).
145. This possibility is similar to that mentioned by Judge Greenberg in his dissent - the
repeated arrest, delayed prosecution anomaly. Balascsak, 873 F.2d at 687 & n.4 (Greenberg, J.,
dissenting).
146. See supra section I.A. The intent for the ACCA to operate in part as a tough federal
"lever'' that could be used to expedite the plea process in state courts implies that the defendant
should find his options under state law relatively attractive when compared with the federal
alternative. State schemes, moreover, are often criticized as ineffective, in part because they tend
to capture the less serious, more easily caught offenders whose offense/conviction patterns more
quickly ripen into the requisite sequence of three pairs. See ABA STANDARDS,§ 18-4.4, at 28081. Reliance on analogies to state habitual offender statutes to interpret the ACCA proves unpersuasive. If Congress "drew on" the state habitual-offender statutes, it could have attached a
similar counting scheme to the ACCA, particularly in its response to the conviction counting
problem in the 1988 post-Wicks amendment. Had Congress wanted an intervening convictions
method applied, it could have simply drafted or amended the Act plainly to require intervening
convictions. More plausibly, Congress wanted a much tougher, more inclusive rule than state
habitual-offender laws. Indeed, had Congress thought state laws worked well enough, there
would be no need to offer a federal response to the recidivist problem at all. See supra section
I.A.
147. 873 F.2d at 684 (Becker, J., concurring).
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difficulty in deciding how much time should be required to count
Balascsak's burglaries as separate episodes:
I concede my inability to establish a bright line, e.g., as to whether
two days' or two weeks' hiatus is enough. But developing the law on a
case-by-case basis and drawing lines depending on the facts is the stuff of
judging and I would leave the development of the law to that process. 148

On the facts of Balascsak, Judge Becker would not have counted the
two burglaries separately, since it was "more than possible that the
two burglaries were committed within minutes of each other."149
Judge Becker correctly implied that some measure of discretion ("the
stuff of judging") must operate in close cases to avoid over- and underinclusive results. He left unanswered the question of appropriate
boundaries for that discretion in the ACCA's mandatory sentencing
scheme.
Judge Greenberg's dissenting opinion essentially argued for a distinct-in-time interpretation. He noted that the labels quoted by the
majority, "career criminal" and "three time loser," apply equally well
to those who commit multiple crimes without intervening convictions
as to those who go through the judicial and penal systems between
offenses, and suggested that Congress was concerned with both types
of offenders. 150 Judge Greenberg correctly pointed to the 1988 amendment, which added the words "committed on different occasions," as
evidence that Congress intended the ACCA to apply to those
criminals involved in repeated criminal episodes, with or without intervening efforts at rehabilitation. 151 In keeping with the Wicks rationale, Judge Greenberg would have counted the two burglaries as
separate convictions since "the burglaries at issue were sufficiently distinct in time and place as to satisfy the applicable standard." 152
In summary, the conviction counting approaches taken by the
courts result in different outcomes when the predicate offenses occur
closely in time. The mechanical Wicks approach almost certainly
leads to sentence enhancement and risks overinclusion. The equally
mechanical Balacscak approach reads so much into the ACCA that it
proves underinclusive. Between the two, the "multiple episodes" concept articulates at best a hazy standard for grouping or distinguishing
separately countable convictions, risking inconsistent outcomes and
reintroducing a large measure of judicial discretion into the sentencing
process.
The same conviction counting issues and problems presented by
the ACCA have surfaced in the development and implementation of
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

873
873
873
873
873

F.2d at
F.2d at
F.2d at
F.2d at
F.2d at

685 (Becker, J., concurring).
684-85 (Becker, J., concurring).
687 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
688 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
688 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
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the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' "career offender" sentence enhancement provisions. The Guidelines may offer useful insights for
interpreting the ACCA.
Ill

COUNTING CONVICTIONS UNDER THE "CAREER OFFENDER"
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

This Part examines the treatment of "career offenders" under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. It briefly examines the basic operation
of the Guidelines and the Guidelines' career offender provision. It
then analyzes the Guidelines' conviction counting method and the application of the method by the federal courts. This Part concludes
that conviction counting under the Guidelines improves upon each of
the various approaches taken under the ACCA.
A.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines

The ACCA represents only one of a number of major federal criminal law reforms enacted in 1984. The Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, 153 of which the ACCA was a part, also contained the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 154 which established the United
States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission). The Sentencing Commission develops the Guidelines and policy statements,
both of which are binding in federal courts. 155 The Guidelines replace
the former discretion-based federal sentencing scheme156 with a system of prescribed sentencing ranges based on specified "offense behavior" and "offender characteristics." 157 Briefly, the Guidelines employ
a "sentencing table," a matrix of incremental sentencing ranges which
increase in proportion to the combined weight of the "offense level" of
153. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984).
154. Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1988, 2017 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59
(1988); 28 u.s.c. §§ 994-98 (1988)).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app.
4 (West Supp. 1991), discussed supra note 15.
156. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note 44, at 5-6, 118-119 (criticizing the extreme disparity
in sentencing attributable to judicial discretion and proposing guidelines developed by a sentencing commission as a remedy); Note, Sentence Enhancement Based on Unconstitutional Prior Convictions, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1373 (1989) (distinguishing discretionary from mandatory
sentencing schemes). Congress expressly found that the then-existing sentencing scheme often
did not "accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense," and implicitly that it often did not
produce appropriate sentences for violent offenders. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(j), (m) (1988). The
tension between the judiciary and the legislature on the issue of sentencing discretion is an old
and recurring theme in the criminal law. See United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1989)
(explaining the move to Guideline-based sentencing as a "pendulum swing" away from the former discretion-based model, a recurrent theme in criminal law reform).
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (c), (d) (1988); see also Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § IA (West
Supp. 1991) (introductory commentary explaining the need for the Guidelines and how they
generally operate); Ogletree, The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988) (explaining the background, promulgation, and operation of the Guidelines).
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the crime and "criminal history category" of the defendant. 158 The
sentencing judge may depart from the guideline range in very few
cases; the Guidelines thus greatly curtail judicial discretion from earlier practice. 159 Furthermore, the sentence ordered is the sentence
served because the Guidelines also abolish parole. 160
Congress directed the Sentencing Commission to develop guidelines that would ensure certain repeat offenders receive prison terms
"at or near the maximum term." 161 Accordingly, the Guidelines contain a "career offender" provision which greatly increases the offense
level and criminal history category - and thus greatly increases the
sentence - of defendants who meet the definition prescribed by Congress. Guideline section 4Bl.1 provides that
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least
eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense
of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 162

The application notes for section 4Bl.1 refer the reader to section
4Bl.2 for definitions of the terms "crime of violence," "controlled substance offense," and "two prior convictions." 163 For defendants quali158. See Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § SA (West Supp. 1991) ("Sentencing Table"). For
the basic mechanics of how the Guidelines work, see supra note 15. By specifying the incremental increases in sentence for each additional prior crime, the Guidelines thus contain the proportionality limitations on sentence enhancement voiced by the ABA during the earlier debate on
the ACCA. See supra note 60.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988); see supra note 15.
160. Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1A3 (West Supp. 1991). The ACCA also eliminates
parole. 18 U.S.C. § 924{e) (1988). For the text of this provision, see supra note 6.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1988). Incapacitation of likely recidivists is one of the "basic purposes of criminal punishment" recognized by Congress in the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (1984), the parent legislation of both the ACCA
and the Guidelines. See Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1A2 (West Supp. 1991) ("the basic
purposes of criminal punishment [are d]eterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and
rehabilitation").
162. Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1 (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
163. Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1, application note 1 (West Supp. 1991). The text
of§ 4Bl.2 reads in part as follows:
(1) The term "crime of violence" means any offense ..• punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another, or
(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
(2) The term "controlled substance offense" means an offense [under a law] prohibiting the
manufacture •.• or distribution [or possession with intent toward distribution] of a controlled substance . . . .
(3) The term "two prior felony convictions" means (A) the defendant committed the instant
offense subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions [of either a qualifying violent
or drug offense, or both], and (B) the sentences for at least two of the aforementioned felony
convictions are counted separately under the provisions of Part A [of Chapter 4].
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.2 (West Supp. 1991); cf. ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924{e)(2) (1988) (The
Guidelines' definition of "crime of violence" nearly mirrors the ACCA definition of "violent
felony;" The definition of "controlled substance offense," although it does not refer to specific
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fying as career offenders, judges must adjust the offense level and
criminal history category above normal levels, thus greatly increasing
the applicable sentencing range in the sentencing table.164
B.

Conviction Counting Under the Guidelines

This section examines conviction counting in the Guidelines career
offender provisions, including the basic test and its application by the
courts. It then examines the Guidelines' concept of criminal "occasions" and its treatment by the courts. Conviction counting issues
identical to those presented under the ACCA arise under the
Guidelines.
1.

The Basic Test

To compute the number of prior felony convictions under the career offender guideline, section 4Bl.1, the judge must use the method
described at section 4Al.2. 165 This section provides in part: "Prior
sentences imposed in unrelated cases are to be counted separately.
Prior sentences imposed in related cases are to be treated as one sentence for purposes of the criminal bistory."166 The application notes
to section 4Al.2 define the term "related," but caution that the
method may not work in all cases.
Related Cases. Cases are considered related if they (1) occurred on a
single occasion, (2) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (3)
were consolidated for trial or sentencing. The court should be aware
that there may be instances in which this definition is overly broad and
will ... underrepresent[] the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history and the danger that he presents to the public. For example, if the
defendant commits a number of offenses on independent occasions separated by a"ests, and the resulting criminal cases are consolidated . . .
[counting the convictions as a single conviction per the general rule] will
not adequately reflect either the seriousness of the defendant's criminal
history or the frequency with which he commits crimes. In such circumstances, the court should consider whether departure is wa"anted. See
anti-drug statutes as does the ACCA, is also quite similar.). Subsection (3), defining "two prior
felony convictions" refers the reader to the conviction counting provisions applicable to criminal
history computation in general. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 4Al.2, 4Al.3 (West Supp. 1991);
infra notes 165·67 and accompanying text. By comparison, the only conviction counting guidance appearing in the ACCA is that the three prior convictions be for oft'enses "committed on
diff'erent occasions" as discussed supra Part II.
164. Because the career offender provision increases the offense level and criminal history
category, the sentencing range from the sentencing table increases. See supra note 15 (explaining
mechanics of the Guidelines); see also infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text (explaining how
the career offender provision applies in ACCA cases).
165. Section 4Bl.2 of the Guidelines, in defining "two prior felony convictions," directs the
sentencing court to section 4Al.2 for guidance in determining whether to count prior convictions
separately. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.2(3) & application note 4 (West Supp. 1991) ("The
provisions of§ 4Al.2 ..• are applicable to the counting of convictions under§ 4Bl.1.").
166. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4A1.2(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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By implication, if offenses occurred on multiple occasions, they should
normally count separately. The statutory language of the ACCA resembles this aspect of the Guidelines.16s
Further, the Guidelines state the general rule that cases "consolidated for sentencing" are considered related and thus counted as a
single prior conviction. Assuming that "consolidated for sentencing"
means sentencing for multiple counts in a single proceeding, and that
no "departure is warranted," many of the conviction patterns in the
ACCA cases examined in Part II (those featuring concurrent sentencing on prior offenses) would not be counted separately under the
Guidelines method.1 69 In practice, however, courts have rarely followed the general "relatedness" rule where the underlying offenses are
serious and factually distinct; upward departure from the Guidelines is
common in such cases.110
To summarize, the Guidelines presumptively count offenses separately only if they are unrelated - committed on independent occasions, arising from separate criminal plans, and not consolidated for
trial or sentencing. Courts may depart from this general rule, however, where the defendant's history shows enough dangerousness or
proclivity to crime to convince the court that sentence enhancement is
appropriate. The Guidelines suggest courts clearly should depart from
this rule, for example, where the defendant's offenses are separated by
intervening arrests. The Guidelines do not mention intervening
convictions.
2. Applications
Courts counting convictions for purposes of the career offender
provision have interpreted the Guidelines in ways that make it difficult
to count defendants' multiple convictions as related. To avoid consolidation, courts either find the section 4Al.2 application note nonbinding or invoke the upward departure provisions applicable to the
Guidelines generally. The following examples illustrate these
approaches.
a. Rejecting strict adherence. At least one court has rejected outright the Guidelines' presumption that convictions for distinct offenses
167. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.2 application note 3 (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1988) (offenses "committed on occasions different from one
another" count separately toward sentence enhancement).
169. Compare United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 193 (9th Cir. 1987) (two same-night
burglaries prosecuted and sentenced together but counted separately under ACCA), cert denied,
488 U.S. 831 (1988) with United States v. Balascsak, 873 F.2d 673, 675 (3d Cir. 1989) (burglaries
on consecutive days sentenced together but not counted separately since no intervening conviction between offenses).
170. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
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are related simply because the cases were consolidated for sentencing.
In United States v. Gross, 171 the defendant had been sentenced in a
single proceeding for two forgeries and for cashing a nonsufficient
funds check on the same day. Although he stipulated that the three
offenses were "factually unrelated criminal actions," 172 the defendant
alleged error in counting the sentences separately for computing his
criminal history, since the cases were sentenced in a single proceeding
and thus "consolidated for sentencing."
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit "reject[ed] that part of Application
Note 3 that suggests that cases consolidated for sentencing are to be
deemed related," finding the application notes to be merely nonbinding "advisory commentary." 173 The court noted that counting convictions for "multiple unrelated offenses" as a single related case, merely
because they were sentenced together, would produce results dramatically different from those for identical defendants who were sentenced
in separate proceedings. 174 Such a result, the court ruled, would be
both inequitable and contrary to the Guidelines' policy of providing
"honesty, uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing." 175 Much as
it had done in the ACCA context in United States v. Wicks, 116 the
Ninth Circuit counted convictions separately for sentence enhancement, even for offenses committed in a single day.111
b. Authorized departures. Even if courts do not reject the "consolidation for sentencing" language outright, they may be able to impose
an enhanced sentence departing from the Guidelines' range. Guideline section 4Al.3 provides: "If reliable information indicates that the
criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of
the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the de171. 897 F.2d 414 (9th Cir. 1990). Gross was not a "career offender'' case; the conviction
counting rules in § 4Al.2, however, apply to the normal criminal history calculation required by
the Guidelines in all federal sentencing proceedings as well as the specific career offender
provision.
172. 897 F.2d at 416.
173. 897 F.2d at 416;seealso United States v. Metcalf, 898 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1990) (sentences
issued on same day for separate burglaries not "consolidated" since offenses proceeded under
separate docket numbers without any order of consolidation and were "not factually tied in any
way"). But see United States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110, 1113 (5th Cir. 1989) (adhering to consolidated sentencing aspect of Application Note 3 and counting such convictions as one); United
States v. White, 893 F.2d 276, 279 (10th Cir. 1990) (same).
174. 897 F.2d at 417.
175. 897 F.2d at 417 (citing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1A3 (West Supp. 1991)). This
rationale accords with the fairness justification for the narrow reading of the criminal history test
in the ACCA. See supra section I.B.
176. 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988).
177. See also United States v. Wildes, 910 F.2d 1484, 1487 (7th Cir. 1990) (In computing
convictions for career offender status, the court stated that "[t]here is something of a mismatch
between 'relatedness' and whether two cases count as 'two .•. convictions' for purposes of
§ 4Bl.1(3)." The court did not have to decide whether to follow Gross, since two distinct sentencing proceedings were available.).
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fendant will commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a
sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range." 178
"Reliable information" may include information about "prior sentence(s) of substantially more than one year imposed as a result of
independent crimes committed on different occasions."179 For example, the Guidelines suggest that a consolidated sentence for a series of
serious assaults would warrant departure. 180 In effect, this departure
provision infuses the conviction counting and sentence enhancement
process with a measured amount of judicial discretion - at least in the
upward direction - since the judge may, but need not, decide the
actual sentence based on facts in the defendant's criminal record other
than the number, type, and timing of prior offenses.
As the Guidelines suggest, the judge has discretion to consider, for
example, the fact that a defendant repeatedly committed similar violent offenses, or has continued to offend despite lengthy prior incarceration. Thus, while permitting discretion in some cases, the Guidelines
nonetheless limit the inquiry to "reliable" facts in the criminal history.
Broad, unguided speculation about the defendant's innocuousness or
dangerousness is not allowed. A representative case illustrates the
sorts of facts judges examine to decide close cases under the
Guidelines.
In United States v. Dorsey, 181 the trial court imposed a sentence in
the range prescribed for career offenders even though all the defendant's prior convictions were consolidated for sentencing. In 1982, an
indictment charged Dorsey with seven bank robberies in two different
states; he pied guilty to four of the robberies and agreed to sentencing
in a single proceeding. 182 While serving his sentence, he escaped and
proceeded to rob four more banks in three different states in two
months. When he was caught, he pied guilty to these four offenses,
again consenting to disposition of the cases in a single proceeding.
The last four robberies formed the "instant offenses" in this case. 183
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the trial court's sentencing
of Dorsey as a career offender to 262 months in prison, even though
the Guidelines generally would characterize the offenses as related because all his prior convictions were "consolidated for sentencing." 184
Technically Dorsey did not qualify as a career offender under section
4B.1. The trial court found, however, the case warranted upward de178. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.3 (West Supp. 1991).
179. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.3(b) (West Supp. 1991).
180. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.3 commentary (West Supp. 1991).
181. 888 F.2d 79 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 756 (1990).
182. 888 F.2d at 80-81. Dorsey's prior convictions had been pled and sentenced simultaneously under FED. R. CRIM. P. 20(a).
183. 888 F.2d at 80.
184. 888 F.2d at 80.
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parture under section 4Al .3 on the basis of reliable facts: the seriousness of Dorsey's crimes and the circumstances of his single-proceeding
sentencing. 185 The court of appeals affirmed:
We do not believe ... someone with a history such as Dorsey's
should be treated as having only one prior conviction, solely because he
is permitted to take advantage of Rule 20(a)'s procedural device....
This is not a case where a defendant committed multiple bank robberies over a short period of time in a single jurisdiction and was tried
and sentenced simultaneously for all the offenses.186

The court noted that, without the procedural consolidation device,
Dorsey would clearly have met the definition of "career offender"
under section 4Bl.l. 187 The court suggested that upward departure
might not have been warranted had the offenses been committed
within a short time span, a principal problem under the ACCA. Dorsey illustrates that, sparingly applied, discretion risks little in the way
of fairness or accuracy.
Dorsey provides one example of a judge's discretionary power to
impose enhanced sentences - even as severe as the career offender
range - via the departure provision in Guidelines section 4Al.3, even
though the "career offender" definition technically fails. 188 By comparison, under ACCA conviction counting approaches, Dorsey's convictions would be counted separately under the "distinct in time" and
185. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
186. 888 F.2d at 81.
187. 888 F.2d at 81.
188. Several cases demonstrate the range of circumstances in which the sentencing judge
may properly depart upward to enhance the sentence of defendants with "under-representative"
criminal histories. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 901 F.2d 988, 989 (11th Cir. 1990) (like
Dorsey, upward departure justified where career offender status would have obtained but for fact
multiple bank robbery convictions resulting from interstate crime spree were "consolidated" for
sentencing under rule 20(a)); United States v. Medved, 905 F.2d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 1990) (seriousness and timing of crimes justified departure; prior conviction related to three separate bank
robberies committed over eight month period), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 997 (1991); United States
v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 78-79 (11th Cir. 1989) (upward departure to 120 months justified
where crimes of record "substantial in number and serious in character'' even though § 4Bl.1
definitions of qualifying offenses for career offender status not precisely met), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 1484 (1990); United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 971, 977 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). In all
cases these courts' exercise of discretion is justified by facts readily apparent from the defendant's
record.
Courts disagree over the circumstances in which judges may exercise discretion to depart
downward - and apply a sentence more lenient than called for by the Guidelines - when the
defendant clearly meets the career offender test, but the judge believes the criminal history overrepresents the defendant's dangerousness and potential for recidivism. Compare United States v.
Smith, 909 F.2d 1164, 1169-70 (8th Cir. 1990) (downward departure upheld as within judge's
discretion where judge determined qualifying burglary and drug offenses to have been "somewhat small-time," and committed at early age and within two-month period), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 691 (1991) with United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 549-51 (11th Cir. 1990)
(neither judge's assessment of underlying robbery and burglary offenses as lacking in "the requisite element of violence" nor his opinion that career offender sentencing was excessively harsh
justified downward departure from applicable career offender range), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2056
(1991).
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"multiple episodes" approaches since he robbed the banks over a
lengthy time (months), and in different states. The "intervening convictions" approach would reach a different result. Dorsey's first four
robberies resulted in a single multicount conviction, and all of his
postescape robberies preceded his second conviction. Given that sequence, the intervening convictions approach would assess Dorsey
with just two prior offenses for sentence enhancement purposes. The
prolific interstate bank robber and prison escapee would not receive an
enhanced sentence. Surely the Guidelines' result is preferable.
c. The Elusive ''Single Occasion. " Both the Guidelines and ACCA
use the concept of a criminal "occasion." 189 Neither the Guidelines
nor the cases applying them define the term directly. Under the
Guidelines, some cases recognize that close-in-time offenses may
amount to a single occasion. In practice, however, factually distinct
offenses often count separately, even where they occurred closely in
time. The Dorsey court, without deciding the issue, noted that sentence enhancement might not have been warranted had he committed
his offenses within a very short time span, 190 bank robberies on the
same day, for example. This situation, of course, presents the most
difficulty under the ACCA. The Guidelines presume cases to be "related," and thus count them as a single offense, if they "occurred on a
single occasion." 191 The presumption, the cases show, presents no
great obstacle to enhancing the sentence in most cases.
In United States v. Jones, 19 2 the defendant argued that two. prior
convictions, one for bank robbery and another for an attempted bank
robbery ninety minutes later, involved offenses which occurred on a
"single occasion," and therefore the convictions should properly have
been counted as only a single related case. On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the trial court's determination that the offenses did not
occur on a single occasion since they were "temporally distinct and
involved two different ... victims." 193 This narrow reading of the
term "occasions" - finding two similar crimes committed minutes
apart to be different, separately countable occasions - mirrors the
Ninth Circuit's "distinct in time" approach under the ACCA. 194 Similarly, in United States v. Gross 195 three convictions for offenses com189. See supra note 167 and accompanying text; supra note 6.
190. 888 F.2d at 81.
191. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.2 application note 3 (West Supp. 1991). The ACCA implies
the same rule, but the term "occasions" is no less ambiguous here than in the ACCA. See supra
note 26 and accompanying text.
192. 899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 275 (1990).
193. 899 F.2d at 1101.
194. See United States v. Wicks, 833 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831
(1988).
195. 897 F.2d 414, 415-417 (9th Cir. 1990). Gross appealed the trial court's separate counting based on consolidated sentencing and lost. Apparently, Gross did not make the "single occa-
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mitted on the same clay were, in the final analysis, counted separately.
In these cases, as in Wicks, the term "occasions" simply means
distinct events occurring at different times, regardless how slight the
interval between events may be. The decisions do not give much
weight to the fact that such brief intervals between offenses might suggest behavior resulting from a one-time impulse rather than recidivist
tendencies. It is unclear whether these defendants would have succeeded had they argued their offenses were related components of a
"single common scheme or plan." 196 Under the Guidelines, where
factually distinct offenses are neither committed simultaneously nor
consolidated for sentencing, a "common scheme" argument may convince the court that the offenses constitute a single related case. 197 No
reported cases address the point.

IV. A

CONSISTENT APPROACH TO FEDERAL CONVICTION
COUNTING

This Part first examines the relationship between "career criminal"
status under the Armed Career Criminal Act and "career offender"
status under the Guidelines. Next, it suggests that the rationale for
examining conviction history under the ACCA and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is the same, and summarizes the ways in which
conviction counting under the Guidelines nonetheless differs from the
various approaches to conviction counting under the ACCA. Finally,
it suggests how and why courts should interpret the ACCA to permit
conviction counting by the same principles they use to apply the
Guidelines. The recommended Guidelines-based approach is consistent with the text and purpose of the ACCA.

A. Relationship Between Career Offender Provision and the ACCA
Until quite recently, no specific Federal Sentencing Guideline existed for violations of the Armed Career Criminal Act. 198 Prior to the
sion" argument, perhaps because he had already conceded that the same-day offenses were
"factually unrelated." 897 F.2d at 416. Prospects for success, had he advanced the argument,
may have been dim in view of the "distinct in time" approach to ACCA conviction counting
taken by the Ninth Circuit in Wicks, 833 F.2d at 194.
196. Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4A1.2 application note 3 (West Supp. 1991).
197. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
198. The Sentencing Commission regularly drafts new guidelines and amendments to the
existing Guidelines and submits these to Congress by May I of each year. Absent modification
or rejection by Congress, the amendments become effective by operation of law on the date specified by the Commission, which must be at least six months after submission to Congress. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 994(0), (p) (1988); Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7109, 102
Stat. 4181, 4419 (1988).
In 1990, the Congress adopted a new Guideline to cover violations of the ACCA. 18
U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4B1.4 (West Supp. 1991) ("Armed Career Criminal"); see 55 Fed. Reg. 19,205
(1990). The text of§ 4Bl.4 follows:
Section 4B1.4. Armed Career Criminal
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adoption of the new "Armed Career Criminal" Guideline in November of 1990, persons sentenced under the ACCA were not sentenced
under the Guidelines199 unless the defendant also qualified for career
offender treatment under section 4Bl.l.200 Under the new Guideline,
armed career criminals are subject to various sentencing ranges, including potential treatment under section 4Bl.1 as a career offender.201 Just as before the adoption of the Armed Career Criminal
Guideline, if an armed career criminal qualifies as a career offender,
the Guidelines increase the mandatory minimum sentence from fifteen
years, the ACCA minimum, to thirty years, which is the bottom of the
range for career offenders when the instant offense of conviction car(a) A defendant who is subject to an enhanced sentence under the provisions of 18 U.S.C.
924(e) is an armed career criminal.
.
(b) The offense level for an armed career criminal is the greatest of:
(1) The offense level applicable from Chapters two and three; or
(2) The offense level from section 4Bl.1 (Career Offender) if applicable; or
(3)(A) 34, if the defendant used or possessed the firearm or ammunition in connection
with a crime of violence or controlled substance offense, as defined in section 4Bl.2(1), or if
the firearm possessed by the defendant was of a type described in 26 U.S.C. 5845(a)•; or
(B) 33, otherwise
*If section 3El.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility) applies, reduce by 2 levels.
(c) The criminal history category for an arm.ed career criminal is the greatest of:
(1) The criminal history category from chapter four, part A (Criminal History), or section 4Bl.1 (Career Offender) if applicable; or
(2) Category VI, if the defendant used or possessed the firearm or ammunition in connection with a crime of violence or controlled substance offense, as defined in section
4Bl.2(1), or if the firearm possessed by the defendant was of a type described in 26 U.S.C.
5845(a); or
(3) Category IV.
18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4 (West Supp. 1991).
The firearms "of a type described in 26 U.S.C. 5845(a)" consist of a class of weapons particularly useful to armed career criminals as opposed to sporting use: "sawed-off" and "cut-down"
shotguns and rifles, machine guns, silencers, and weapons "capable of being concealed on the
person" are clearly covered by the section. Antiques and rifled pistols and shoulder-fired arms
(hunting weapons, for example) are excepted from the definition. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a), (e)
(1988).
The text of the guideline suggests that the offense level for any armed career criminal will be
at least 33. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4(b)(3) (West Supp. 1991). The criminal history category
will be at least Category IV. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4(c)(3) & commentary (West Supp. 1991).
That translates to a minimum sentencing range of 188-235 months, a range just inside the 15
years to life range mandated by the ACCA. The Career Offender Guideline, section 4Bl.1, may
apply in a proper case. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 4Bl.4(b)(2), (c)(l) (West Supp. 1991). The Career
Offender provision imposes a mandatory offense level of 37 (where the statutory maximum penalty is life, as with the ACCA) and a minimum history category of VI. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4
§ 4Bl.1, (West Supp. 1991). The applicable sentencing range in that case - where the ACCA
and Career Offender provisions apply - translates to 30 years to life. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § SA
(West Supp. 1991) ("Sentencing Table").
199. See United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1198 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing the absence of a guideline for ACCA violations and calling for the Sentencing Commission to develop
one), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969 (1988). Sentencing under the ACCA, simply was not addressed
by the Guidelines. Judges attempting to apply the Guidelines to the ACCA defendant had no
Guideline to apply.
200. See, e.g., Jackson, 835 F.2d at 1197. ACCA defendants can also qualify as career offenders in some cases. See infra notes 210-15 and accompanying text.
201. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4 (West Supp. 1991).
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ries a statutory maximum penalty of life imprisonment. 202
Courts freely and frequently mix the terms "career offender" and
"career criminal" in recidivist cases.203 Intuitively, the two concepts
seem interchangeable, which suggests any "career offender" possessing
a firearm is an "armed career criminal." However indistinguishable
the semantics may be, under the mechanics of current sentencing law,
the two concepts must be understood as distinct. No "armed career
criminal" wants to be determined a "career offender" as well because
such a finding brings an extra fifteen years imprisonment. 204 Similarly, few "career offenders" convicted of possessing a weapon would
want to be determined an "armed career criminal" because such a
finding could raise their offense level by several orders.20s
The actual offense before the court at the time of conviction distinguishes the "armed career criminal" from the "career offender."
Only the offense of firearm possession by a felon206 raises the possibility of armed career criminal status. 207 In contrast, under the Guidelines, the instant offense of conviction must meet the "crime of
violence" or "controlled substance offense" definitions208 to qualify
the defendant for career offender treatment. 209
202. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4, §§ 4Bl.1, SA (West Supp. 1991); see also United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 2057 (1991) (applying Career Offender
guideline and thus increasing ACCA minimum sentence to 360 months); United States v.
O'Neal, 910 F.2d 663, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296,
304-05 (3d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 3221 (1990) (same).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Belton, 890 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1989), in which Judge Posner
used the terms interchangeably to describe the defendant:
Nothing in the guideline's definition of a career offender requires, however,that every act
constitutive of the offense underlying his current conviction have been committed after the
prior conviction • • • • A career criminal is incorrigible, undeterrable, recidivating, unresponsive to the "specific deterrence" of having been previously convicted - and that is a good
description of a man who continues trafficking in narcotics after having been arrested and
convicted of a similar crime.
890 F.2d at 10 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Davenport, 884 F.2d 121, 123 (4th Cir.
1989) (Career Offender definition met, therefore defendant was a "career criminal"); United
States v. Campbell, 888 F.2d 76, 77 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussing Career Offender provision as a
"career criminal adjustment"), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1984 (1990); United States v. Jordan, 890
F.2d 968, 970-71 (7th Cir. 1989) (same).
204. See supra note 198.
205. Career offenders' sentences will be less than if they were also ACCA violators where the
instant offense of conviction has a statutory maximum penalty less than the life imprisonment
maximum for violations of the ACCA. See Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1 (West Supp.
1991); cf. United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing the increase in sentence resulting from ACCA status), cert denied, 485 U.S 969 (1988).
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1988) (criminalizing possession of a firearm by convicted
felons).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1988) (ACCA applies only to violators of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(1988) with the requisite prior convictions).
208. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.2 (West Supp. 1991) (definitions of instant offenses required for career offender classification).
209. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1(2) (West Supp. 1991) (instant offense of conviction must
be crime of violence or controlled substance offense to treat defendant as career offender).
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A defendant can qualify as both an armed career criminal and a
career offender under two possible scenarios. First, some defendants
convicted on firearms charges with histories reached by the ACCA210
are also convicted in the same proceeding for a violent or drug offense. 211 The latter crime supplies the instant offense required for career offender treatment. Of course this scenario assumes at least two
of the prior convictions count separately under the Guidelines.212
Second, if the "felon in possession of a firearm" offense, which triggers the ACCA, also qualifies as a "crime of violence" under the
Guidelines, then the firearm offense can operate as the instant offense
for career offender classification. 213 This scenario requires at least
three prior convictions counted separately under the ACCA, and at
least two under Guidelines section 4Bl.1. Courts disagree on whether
mere "possession" of a firearm by a felon meets the definition of
"crime of violence," but several have concluded that possession may
qualify under certain circumstances. 214 In those cases where the possession offense amounts to a "crime of violence," the career criminal
will qualify for a minimum thirty-year sentence as a career offender.
Once again, this assumes at least two prior convictions count separately under the Guidelines.21s
Where the career offender provision applies to defendants who also
qualify for ACCA sentence enhancement, the mandatory minimum
sentence increases from fifteen years, the minimum under the ACCA,
to thirty years. The increase arises from the fact that the ACCA has a
statutory maximum penalty of life.216 The career offender provision
210. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988).
211. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 835 F.2d 1195, 1196-97 (7th Cir. 1987) (defendant
convicted of violating ACCA in connection with bank robbery; bank robbery provided instant
violent felony offense for career offender classification under Guidelines § 4Bl.1), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 969 (1988).
212. Cf. Jackson, 835 F.2d at 1196 (defendant's five prior armed robbery convictions were
separately countable under both ACCA and Career Offender provision of Guidelines, § 4Bl.1).
Staleness prevents crimes from being counted under the Guidelines, but not under the ACCA.
Compare United States v. Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir.) (Guidelines § 4Al.2(e) prohibits counting convictions more than 15 years old for career offender purposes), vacated on other
grounds, 921 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1990) with United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 89 (3d Cir.
1990) (ACCA places no restriction on how recent prior convictions must be to be considered for
sentence enhancement), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1002 (1991) and United States v. Greene, 810
F.2d 999, 1000 (11th Cir. 1986) (four burglary convictions from 1962 used to enhance sentence
under ACCA in 1985).
213. See, e.g., United States v. O'Neal, 910 F.2d 663, 667 (9th Cir. 1990).
214. Compare O'Nea/, 910 F.2d at 667 (possession of firearm by convicted felon under any
circumstances is categorically a "crime of violence" within the definition in Guidelines § 4Bl.2)
with United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915, 917-19 (7th Cir. 1990) (possession of gun where
defendant used force in struggle with arresting officer is crime of violence, but possession in
absence of force may not be), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2057 (1991) and United States v. Williams,
892 F.2d 296, 304 (3d Cir. 1989) ("possessing a gun while firing it •.. is a crime of violence;
possession without firing the weapon is not"), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3221 (1990).
215. See, e.g., O'Nea/, 910 F.2d at 663, 668.
216. See supra note 6.
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pre8cribes an offense level of thirty-seven for offenses with statutory
life maximums. 217 Combined with the prescribed criminal history category of VI which applies to all career offenders,218 this translates to a
sentencing range of 360 months to life.219 Thus the Guidelines increase the ACCA defendant's minimum sentence by fifteen years when
the career offender provision also applies.
The table below compares the ACCA and the Career Offender provision of the Guidelines.
Federal Sentencing
ACCA
Guidelines
Statutory Basis* 18 U.S.C. 924(e)
Career Offender Guideline
4Bl.1
Instant Offense 18 u.s.c. 922(g)
"crime of violence" or
(possession of firearm by
"controlled substance
felon)
offense" as defined in
Guideline § 4Bl.2
Prior Offenses
Number:
3 or more
2 or more
Type:**
"violent felony or serious
Same type as instant
drug offense"
offense
Relationship
"committed on different
"Unrelated" or departure
Between
occasions"***
warranted
Convictions:
None older than 15 years
Staleness:
No staleness limit
may be counted
*Both ACCA and Guidelines trace their lineage to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
**The statutory definitions for violent and drug offenses under the ACCA and under the
Guidelines are, for purposes of this Note, identical. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2) and
Guidelines, § 4Bl.2.
***The phrase is construed and applied by the courts in significantly different ways, as described
in Part II.

B.

Common Purposes and Divergences

The Armed Career Criminal Act and the Guidelines count convictions for the same purpose. Both laws are designed to enhance
sentences for offenders whose criminal history suggests they deserve
harsher treatment. 220 Under both, courts count convictions to deter217. Guidelines, 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1 (West Supp. 1991).
218. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.1 (West Supp. 1991).
219. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § SA (West Supp. 1991).
220. See Taylor v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 2143, 2149 (1990) (characterizing ACCA as a
"sentence-enhancement provision"); see also Note, supra note 156, at 1380 (explaining that Federal Sentencing Guidelines effect sentence enhancement for all but first time offenders). Sentence
enhancement for recidivists - "career'' criminal offenders - is commonly justified on grounds
of incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 571 (1967)
(Warren, C.J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); see also SENTENCING, supra note 12, at
187-301; Note, supra note 156, at 1373-74.
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mine whether and to what degree to enhance the defendant's sentence.221 Thus, conviction counting, whether under the ACCA or the
Guidelines, serves to distinguish defendants who properly warrant an
enhanced sentence.
Although their ultimate purposes are virtually identical, the conviction counting schemes employed under the ACCA and the Guidelines diverge in practice, leading to different results. The ACCA
requires that offenses be committed on different "occasions" to count
toward sentence enhancement.222 Under the ACCA, several courts
have counted offenses separately where there was only a small distinction in time between them, such as burglaries committed on the same
night or on successive days. 223 Other courts have placed little emphasis on the temporal distinction, looking instead to the underlying factual relationship between the offenses to determine if they amount to a
single "criminal episode."224 Still another court has refused to count
offenses separately unless they are separated by intervening convictions, regardless of the temporal relationship between offenses.225
The Guidelines take a similar occasion-based approach, but develop it differently. As a general rule, the Guidelines count offenses
together if they occurred on a "single occasion," or were "consolidated" for trial or sentencing.226 The Guidelines, however, give judges
the discretionary power to impose an enhanced sentence where the
defendant's criminal record, if assessed in strict compliance with the
general rule, "underrepresents" the defendant's actual dangerousness
or likelihood of recidivism. 227 The few reported cases suggest that a
close relationship in time between offenses does not compel the conclusion that the offenses were committed on a "single occasion" if they
are factually and temporally distinct crimes.228 Further, as Dorsey
demonstrates, the "consolidated for sentencing or trial" rule has little
force; courts may impose sentences greater than the consolidation
rule, if applied, would produce.229
No court applying the Guidelines has adopted any method similar
to the "intervening convictions" approach taken by the Third Circuit
in counting convictions under the ACCA. 230 The text of the Guide221. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988); 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 §§ 4Al.2, 4Bl.l (West Supp. 1991). See
generally supra Parts II and III.
222. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1988); see supra section I.C.
223. See supra section 11.B.l.
224. See supra section 11.B.2.
225. See supra section 11.B.3.
226. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
229. See United States v. Dorsey, 888 F.2d 79, 79 (11th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
756 (1990).
230. See supra section 11.B.3.
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lines clearly does not impose such a requirement. 231 Thus, courts applying the Guidelines to potential career offenders have repeatedly
counted offenses separately without intervening convictions. 232
Courts separately counting convictions for offenses committed
within a short time span have justified their decisions by their authority to depart from the general counting rules in "underrepresentative"
cases.233 Thus, they retain the ability to count offenses arrayed closely
in time as a "single occasion" - and thus, "related" - in cases where
they do not believe the defendant is so dangerous or incorrigible as to
warrant an enhanced sentence. By comparison, if judges applying the
ACCA adhere strictly to the "distinct in time" approach taken in
United States v. Wicks, 234 even when they do not believe the defendant
is particularly dangerous or incorrigible, they must impose enhanced
sentences under the ACCA. Such enhancement would not be required
under the Guidelines.
C.

Toward Consistency

Congress delegated to the U.S. Sentencing Commission broad authority to review and rationalize the federal sentencing process.235
The Commission's ongoing effort produces the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 236 With the enactment of the new Armed Career Criminal
Guideline,237 sentencing policy as represented by the Guidelines now
reaches the ACCA. Given the preeminence of the Guidelines in the
federal sentencing scheme, and the similar purpose "conviction counting" serves in both the Guidelines and the ACCA, there is a strong
case for applying the ACCA as consistently as possible with the conviction counting method used under the Guidelines' criminal history
and Career Offender analysis.
Courts take one of two general directions when applying the
ACCA. The first attempts to read the statute according to its "plain
meaning," interpreting the phrase "committed on different occasions
from one another" to mean simply, and in all cases, "distinct in time."
Such an approach poses significant problems: at the margins, it unnecessarily compromises the fundamental sentencing goals of proportionality (treating different cases differently) and uniformity (treating
similar cases the same). 238 The paradigm "revolving door" criminal
231. See, e.g., Dorsey, 888 F.2d at 80-81.
232. See supra note 188 (collecting cases where Guidelines were applied without any intervening convictions requirement).
233. See supra note 188 (collecting upward departure cases).
234. 833 F.2d 192 (9th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 831 (1988).
235. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976
(1984) (relevant sections are codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b), 994(a) (1988)).
236. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § lAl (West Supp. 1991).
237. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4 (West Supp. 1991).
238. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 1A3 (West Supp. 1991).
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differs in compelling ways from the offender who commits three offenses on a single drunken night. 239 Punishing the two offenders similarly compromises these goals, since the cases differ, but the treatment
is the same.
The second route courts take when applying the ACCA recognizes
the difficulty of the "mechanical" approach and searches for some alternative justified by legislative intent. The "criminal episodes" and
"intervening convictions" approaches exemplify this effort.240 These
methods, most notably the intervening convictions approach, inevitably lead to differences between identifying career criminals/offenders
under the ACCA and under the Guidelines, even in the same federal
courtroom. This problem could surface often in the future since all
ACCA cases are now covered by an applicable sentencing guideline.241
The Guidelines' approach, by comparison, allows sufficient flexibility
in these hard cases to achieve the best result. The Guidelines accomplish this using generally applicable counting rules augmented by provisions for departure in cases where the judge finds the defendant is
especially dangerous or incorrigible, and thus deserves sentence enhancement. 242 The Guidelines implicitly recognize that the ultimate
judgment in very difficult cases is best left to judges.243
Until Congress amends the ACCA to better explain the intended
treatment of closely related crimes, courts facing difficult decisions in
armed career criminal cases should look to the Guidelines' counting
principles, including the discretionary departure provisions. Because
Congress reviews and may modify or reject Guidelines amendments
before they become law,244 the Guidelines represent the clearest, most
current, and most comprehensive expression of how Congress wants
the sentencing process - including sentence enhancement for recidivists - to operate. The Guidelines originated in the same legislative
effort as the ACCA, and their constant revision ensures their current
vitality. Ambiguous terms, such as "occasions" and "episodes" are
more likely to be given meaning in the revision of the Guidelines than
in the ACCA. Importantly, now that a guideline has been specifically
written for ACCA violations, 245 sentencing in ACCA cases may now
239. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
240. See supra Part II. Of course, the intervening convictions approach operates just as
mechanically as the distinct in time method, since it requires no discretion on the judge's part to
determine whether each offense was preceded by a prior conviction. The adoption of such a
standard, however, substitutes the court's standard for Congress' completely different one - the
court's nonmalleable standard versus Congress' "malleable" one. United States v. Balascsak, 873
F.2d 673, 683-84 (3d Cir. 1989).
241. See supra section IV.A.
242. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
243. See Judge Becker's similar views in Balacscak, 873 F.2d at 684-85 (Becker, J.,
concurring).
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1988).
245. 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Bl.4 (West Supp. 1991).
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be viewed as a component part of the overall federal scheme, rather
than as an anomaly.
The Guidelines also offer a rapidly growing body of federal case
law that dwarfs that available under the ACCA. Conviction counting
arises in some way in virtually all cases under the Guidelines, not only
those involving Career Offenders. Thus, the Guidelines cases offer a
rich source of facts, problems and solutions for consideration in
ACCA cases. By drawing on the Guidelines principles, the discretion
inherent in episodes-type approaches to the ACCA could be applied in
ways reviewed and approved by Congress. Because Congress specifically indicates that it wishes to limit judicial discretion in sentencing
by moving to mandatory sentencing laws and the Guidelines, it makes
sense to conform to the best expression of those limits.
The Guidelines suggest several principles that would alleviate the
confusion and divergence that currently mark conviction counting
under the ACCA. First, courts should, in effect, presume that offenses
constitute a single "occasion" under the ACCA when the offenses
were (1) committed over a brief time span, (2) "consolidated for trial
or sentencing," or (3) proved to have been part of a "common scheme
or plan."246 The majority of courts, those that apply the "criminal
episodes" approach, have essentially already taken this view.241 This
presumption corresponds to the general rules for counting convictions
provided under the Guidelines' relatedness principle.248 Importantly,
this rule must operate only as a presumption. If the rule were hard
and fast, many criminals, for example those with several prior offenses
that had been consolidated for sentencing, would know the ACCA
could not reach them. Criminals cannot be so sure, however, if courts
may depart from the presumption. The proposal thus does not sacrifice any significant degree of leverage:249 only close cases present "occasion" questions, and even then the defendant faces the possibility of
sentence enhancement.
Courts should override the above presumption in the same circumstances that warrant "departure" under the Guidelines - those situations where the defendant's conviction history demonstrates special
incorrigibility or dangerousness. Criminal histories showing the fortuitous concurrent sentencing of multiple violent crimes or persistence in
violent crime after treatment are not the cases that give pause.250 Un246. See 18 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 4Al.2 (West Supp. 1991). In future Guidelines revisions,
"occasions" could be defined, for example, to mean some discreet period of time, i.e., a day or so,
affording plenty of time for the criminal to reflect and change his behavior. Defendants with
several egregious offenses within 24 hours could still get enhanced sentences if the general rule
underrepresented the seriousness of their history.
247. See supra section 11.B.2 (criminal episodes approach).
248. See supra section I.A.; supra section III.A.
249. See supra section II.A.
250. See supra section 11.B.2.
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like the hypothetical three-houses-in-one-night burglar, these defendants do not present a strong chance that the offenses represent an
isolated incident, anomalous to the defendant's character, and unlikely
to be repeated. 251 Quite the contrary. Here courts should enhance the
sentence, satisfying any doubts by keeping to the low end of the sentencing range. This suggestion is consistent with the Guidelines' provisions for defendants with "underrepresentative" criminal
histories. 252 In practice, defendants such as Towne253 - a violent,
repeat sex offender and rehabilitative failure - could be incapacitated
under the ACCA.
Finally, courts should not require intervening convictions in order
to count offenses separately. Neither the text of the ACCA nor counting practice under the Guidelines remotely suggest Congress intended
such a requirement as a prerequisite to sentence enhancement. As is
common practice under the Guidelines,254 defendants with egregious
records, but fortuitously sentenced in a single proceeding, should receive enhanced sentences where their records contain reliable facts
showing recidivism and dangerousness.
The suggested approach meets the criteria set forth in Part I by
preserving leverage, keeping the scope of inquiry narrow, and not requiring repeated rehabilitative failure. The suggested approach preserves the leverage function in the ACCA. 255 Even where all of a
defendant's prior offenses were, for example, committed within a short
time span or sentenced concurrently, the offender could not be certain
the ACCA could not reach him. The suggested approach threatens
such offenders because it gives judges the same discretionary departure
power they have under the Guidelines. Allowing departure improves
upon the intervening convictions approach, which automatically excludes these defendants without regard to the severity of their prior
offenses. 256 In intervening convictions jurisdictions, the ACCA poses
no possible threat to, for example, concurrently sentenced defendants
with three prior offenses, because such offenders know the court cannot count their prior offenses individually. The suggested approach,
by comparison, provides the "threat of prosecution" Congress
intended. 257
The suggested approach also keeps the scope of the inquiry prop251. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
252. See supra section 111.B.
253. See supra section 11.B.2.
254. See supra note 188 (collecting upward departure cases).
255. See supra section I.A (explaining the leverage concept envisioned by ACCA drafters).
256. See supra sections l.C and 11.B.3 (explaining ACCA treatment of offense/conviction
sequences versus the intervening convictions/rehabilitative failure approach).
257. Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (discussing how the threat of prosecution under ACCA
will have a beneficial leveraging effect).
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erly narrow. 258 Courts can apply this standard based on information
readily available in the "certified court records"259 documenting the
defendant's criminal history. Courts do not necessarily need to analyze the particular facts underlying prior offenses, 260 nor must they
attempt any "clinical diagnosis" of individual defendants. 261 As
United States v. Dorsey 262 illustrates, courts can base enhancement decisions on information from the conviction history alone. The narrow
inquiry accords with the text of the ACCA, which speaks only of the
number, type, and timing of prior offenses. 263
The suggested approach does not require defendants to have failed
at rehabilitation on three prior occasions before the ACCA can reach
them. 264 Multiple-count convictions can still qualify where the defendant committed the offenses on different occasions.265 Even if the
offenses were consolidated for sentencing, and thus resulted in only
one rehabilitative opportunity, the judge has the same ability as under
the Guidelines to enhance the sentence. 266 The recommended approach thus permits courts to enhance the sentences of skilled or insulated criminals whose serious offenses tend to come to justice all at
once.261
The suggested approach involves a significant degree of judicial
discretion in sentencing, which mandatory sentencing laws in general,
and the ACCA in particular, seek fundamentally to minimize. 268
Some degree of "discretion," however, is inevitable so long as courts
are forced to apply phraseology as ambiguous as in the ACCA to the
258. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (ACCA contemplates narrow inquiry).
259. Id.
260. See supra section 11.B.2 (criminal episode approach considers selected facts underlying
particular crime).
261. See supra section I.B (unfairness and error of diagnostic-type inquiries put to Congress
by ABA during ACCA hearings).
262. 888 F.2d 79 (11th Cir. 1989) (discussed supra section III.B), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 756
(1990).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1988).
264. See supra sections I.C and 11.B.3 (Intervening convictions approach requires three failed
rehabilitative opportunities, although 1988 ACCA amendment does not.).
265. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (Sen. Biden's explanation of intended applica·
tion of the ACCA).
266. See supra notes 181-88 and accompanying text (upward departure under the Guidelines
in under-representative cases).
267. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (underinclusiveness of intervening convictions approach when applied to insulated criminals or those skilled in avoiding capture for
long periods).
268. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 13, at§ 18-4.4 (mandatory sentencing laws represent
legislatures' attempts to curtail judicial discretion); see also United States v. Pinto, 875 F.2d 143,
145 (7th Cir. 1989) (Judge Easterbrook explaining the absence of broad discretion in the career
offender provision: "Criminals aren't entitled to sentences devised by judges rather than
legislatures.").
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diverse circumstances presented by the cases before them. 269 Further,
the amount of discretion involved does not significantly increase that
already at work under the prevailing "criminal episodes" approach.
Rather, the suggested approach allows discretion to operate as consistently as possible in all federal sentence enhancement decisions. Facts
that lead to sentence enhancement under the Guidelines will also lead
to sentence enhancement under the ACCA. Judges can analyze prior
offense patterns the same way, regardless of which specific sentence
enhancement statute provides the authority. Finally, the degree of discretion suggested accords with the optimal level prescribed by Congress in the Guidelines. It is specious to believe that Congress
intended "armed career criminals" to be identified and sentenced in
significantly different ways from those used for "career offenders." If
anything, Congress considers "career offenders" more dangerous; the
minimum penalty under the ACCA increases if career offender status
also obtains. 270 If Congress permits the career offender decision to be
subject to some degree of judicial discretion, surely it approves of a
similar amount in the ACCA context.
CONCLUSION

The Armed Career Criminal Act classifies offenders as career
criminals if they have committed serious offenses on at least three different occasions. Congress has adopted a policy of incapacitation toward career criminals so identified; the ACCA commands courts to
sentence career criminals to long terms. Courts struggle deciding how
to differentiate criminal occasions for sentence enhancement under the
ACCA because the term "occasions" proves vague in close cases.
Compounding the difficulty, mandatory sentencing laws aim to minimize the judicial discretion required to interpret the term to avoid
anomalous results in close cases.
Both minority interpretations of the ACCA remove judicial discretion from the analysis by relying on either distinctions in time between
offenses or on the fact of intervening convictions between offenses.
The former disserves incapacitation policy by its overinclusiveness; it
wastes scarce resources and results in unjustly harsh sentences. The
latter can frustrate incapacitation policy by its underinclusiveness; the
law will not reach many career criminals, and thus fails to protect
society from these offenders. Because many offenders could not possibly be reached, the leverage function of the ACCA loses much of its
credibility and force.
·
The majority view attempts to differentiate occasions by grouping
offenses into criminal episodes. This interpretation necessarily rein269. Cf. United States v. Balacscak, 873 F.2d 673, 684-85 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J.
concurring).
270. See supra section IV.A.
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troduces discretion into the analysis, causing further struggle over
where to properly draw the lines between episodes. Because courts
applying the ACCA must exercise this discretion without the benefit
of clear congressional intent, decisions rendered in close cases may
prove either over- or underinclusive, and will almost surely produce
quite different results between different jurisdictions.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines offer a solution to the ACCA
conviction counting problem. The Guidelines enhance the sentences
of career offenders - fundamentally the same group of offenders
termed career criminals under the ACCA. The Guidelines, like the
ACCA, identify career offenders on the basis of the defendant's prior
offenses. Unlike the ACCA, the Guidelines provide statutory principles for courts to use to differentiate offenses into separate occasions.
The Guidelines recognize that, in some cases, strict adherence to these
rules may fail to capture deserving offenders, such as when years of
bank robbery offenses come to justice in a single proceeding. In these
cases, the Guidelines allow the courts discretion to impose an enhanced sentence based on reliable facts demonstrating dangerousness
or recidivism. This guidance focuses the exercise of discretion in a
way that serves, rather than frustrates, the underlying incapacitation
policy. Egregious defendants do not benefit from the fortuities of their
prior arrests or sentencing.
Drawing on the Guidelines' methodology would alleviate much of
the trouble with the ACCA. First, the Guidelines would eliminate the
harsh, much criticized results that sometimes occur under minority
approaches to the ACCA. To exaggerate the difference in standards,
imagine a defendant convicted of three offenses committed within
minutes of each other, and twenty years later found in possession of a
hunting rifle. The mechanical, "distinct in time" approach leads to
enhanced sentencing as an armed career criminal; the Guidelinesbased approach will not.
Second, use of the Guidelines' methodology would improve the
consistency of criminal history analysis in and between jurisdictions.
The Guidelines' conviction counting methodology produces a large
volume of case law to which courts applying the ACCA can turn for
precedent and guidance. Furthermore, the Guidelines recently
adopted an Armed Career Criminal Guideline which applies to those
defendants determined career criminals under the ACCA. Depending
on the instant offense, the Career Offender Guideline may also apply.
Applying Guidelines methods in ACCA cases would avoid analyzing
the defendant's history for the same basic purpose - classification as a
career criminal/offender - but in different ways.
Finally, using Guidelines principles fo apply the ACCA ensures
that judges exercise discretion in a manner reviewed and approved by
Congress. Since the subject of judges' analysis, prospective career
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criminals' or offenders' histories, and the objective of the analysis,
identification of proper subjects for incapacitation, is the same under
the ACCA and the Guidelines, it follows that the analysis under the
two laws should be conducted in similar ways. The Guidelines articulate the approved methodology in much greater detail than the
ACCA. Moreover, the continual revision of the Guidelines promises
further guidance as the case law evolves and the Sentencing Commission and Congress respond. In close cases, judicial discretion is a tool
indispensable to the accurate identification of career offenders. The
Guidelines offer the best instructions for its use.
-

James E. Hooper

